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Abstract
This paper attempts to provide a chronological history of the signicant
events and inuences that have shaped the regulation of biotechnology by the
Federal Food and Drug Administration. This paper rst chronicles the evolution
of each of the separate elds of regulation into which biological products are
categorized by the FDA (drugs, biologics, devices, and foods). Part III of this
paper then discusses the rst call for governmental regulation of biotechnology
and the struggle for regulatory form that this shift in administrative authority
created. Part IV describes the Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of
Biotechnology. Part V discusses subsequent eorts, both Congressional and
administrative, to reform the regulation of biotechnology by FDA.
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1I. Introduction
Twenty-ve years ago, Harvard researchers isolated and cloned the rst com-
plete mammalian gene, which encoded a component of hemoglobin in rabbits.
Today, researchers and regulators are trying to cope with the implications of
the newfound ability to clone complete mammals, including humans. The rapid
pace of discovery in the biotechnological sciences has created substantial di-
culties for the Federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which ensures the
safety and ecacy of many of the products of biological research.1The speed of
1The Oce of Technology Assessment denes biotechnology as \any technique that uses
living organisms (or parts of organisms) to make or modify products, to improve plants or
animals, or to develop micro-organisms for specic uses.... Biotechnology is the most recent
phase in a historical continuum of the use of biological organisms for practical purposes."
Oce of Technology Assessment, Commercial Biotechnology: An International Analysis at 3
(Jan. 1984); U.S. General Accounting Oce, Biotechnology: Agriculture's Regulatory System
Needs Clarication at 8 (Mar. 1986) (Report to the Chairman, House Committee on Science
and Technology). A brief chronology of landmark events in biotechnology includes:
1944 Avery, MacLeod, and McCarty demonstrate that deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is
the genetic material utilized by most living organisms.
1953 Watson and Crick discover the double-helical structure of DNA.
1969 Isolation of a complete gene by a Harvard research team.
1973 Boyer and Cohen functionally insert a toad gene into a bacterium, which marks the
beginning of genetic engineering.
1977 A human gene is cloned.
1980 Insertion of a human gene (coding for interferon) into a bacterium.
1980 Cline et al. create a transgenic animal, a genetically-modied mouse
1982 FDA approves a genetically-engineered drug, recombinant insulin produced in bac-
teria.
1983 Scientists at Cetus Corp. develop a technique for rapid and consistent in vitro repli-
cation of DNA, called the polymerase chain reaction (PCR).
1986 FDA approves a genetically-engineered vaccine for use in humans, used to inoculate
against Hepatitis B.
1988 The United States Patent and Trademark Oce awards to Harvard University a
patent for a genetically-modied animal.
1990 Launch of a project to sequence every gene in humans, named the Human Genome
Project.
1990 Gene therapy developed for use in humans, rst performed by W. French Anderson
on a four-year-old girl to treat an immune disorder called ADA deciency.
1990 FDA approves a recombinant product called Chymosin for use in food.
1992 NIH les patent applications on thousands of gene fragments.
1992 The U.S. Army begins collecting blood and tissue samples from all new recruits as
part of a genetic dog tag program aimed at better identication of soldiers killed in combat.
1992 In vitro testing of human embryos for genetic abnormalities.
1993 Cloning of human embryos, kept alive for several days in a laboratory
2biotechnological logical discovery necessarily requires rapid product approval by
regulators, as any substantial regulatory delay in the introduction of new biolog-
ical products could result in those products becoming obsolete before they ever
reach the consumer market. Additionally, the rapid spread of many modern
diseases, such as AIDS, has exerted enormous pressure upon FDA to expedite
approval or pre-approve possible therapeutic products, as delay in approving a
potential cure may harm more people than any potential adverse eects of that
product.
Acting contrary to these pressures to speed approval, however, is the reluc-
tance of FDA to approve novel products with little clinical testing data. Because
knowledge of eect far too often exceeds knowledge of cause in biotechnology, a
thorough evaluation of the safety and ecacy of biological products requires ex-
tensive experimentation and analysis, particularly when considering long-term
adverse eects.
These conicting requirements for the regulation of biological products have pro-
duced a system of administrative oversight that is especially uid and dynamic.
FDA has traditionally insisted that only an initial product-by-product review
1993 Production of a rough map of all human chromosomes.
1994 FDA approves a recombinant food, a genetically-modied tomato.
1995 J. Craig Ventner and TIGR announce the sequencing of the rst complete genome,
that of the bacterium Haemophilus inuenzae.
1997 Cloning of a complete animal, a sheep named Dolly.
1998 Cloning of eight identical calves utilizing cells from a single adult cow.
For a more extensive listing of noteworthy events in the development of biotechnology,
see Michael J. Malinowski & Maureen A. O'Rourke, A False Start? The Impact of Federal
Policy on the Genotechnology Industry, 13 Yale J. on Reg. 163 (Winter 1996); Michael D.
Lemonick & Dick Thompson, From Mendel to Monica, Time, January 11, 1999; Michael D.
Lemonick & Dick Thompson, Racing to Map Our DNA, Time, January 11, 1999.
3of applications would allow FDA sucient ability to adapt quickly to changes
in the biotechnology eld, in order to impose sucient regulatory protections
to ensure product safety while retaining FDA's ability to expedite or accelerate
the approval process both for new products that pose little risk of injury or for
classes of products that either have proven safe and eective or are desperately
needed by terminally-ill patients.
As a result of the level of innovation and compromise present in the FDA product
approval process, the status of legislation governing FDA approval of products
derived from biotechnology is often far behind the actual administrative regula-
tions and practices utilized by FDA examiners. This trend is especially evident
in the recent set of Congressional reforms to FDA procedures and practices con-
tained within the FDA Modernization Act of 1997, many of which were already
available informally to product manufacturers through FDA administrative ef-
forts and initiatives to speed the approval process and thereby access by the
public to novel therapies.
Thus, applicants that have an understanding of current FDA procedures in com-
bination with an ability to predict areas in which FDA is likely to compromise
possess a substantial competitive advantage. This ability to predict changes in
FDA approval policy derives in part from a knowledge of the standard ways
in which FDA policy has evolved historically, the pressures and inuences that
prompted those historical changes, and an appreciation of the inuences that
exist currently and their likely eect; however, no concise treatment of the
historical development of these policies, pressures, and inuences exists. The
4purpose of this article, therefore, is to attempt to identify and analyze the major
historical changes and inuences that have shaped the regulation of biotechnol-
ogy by FDA during the twentieth century.
II.
FDA Regulatory Authority Prior to the Biotechnology Era (1902
- 1976)
Throughout the duration of its regulation of biotechnology, FDA has stead-
fastly maintained that \the agency need not establish new administrative pro-
cedures to deal with generic concerns about biotechnology."2As a result of this
policy, products of biotechnology do not comprise a distinct product group
within FDA, but are instead categorized on a product-by-product basis as a
\food", \drug", \device", or \biologic"|four standard product areas of FDA
jurisdiction (excluding cosmetics).3 This dependence upon pre-existing product
areas causes FDA approval of products of biotechnology to be strongly inu-
enced by shifts in FDA's general treatment of each of the four product areas,
thus, a thorough understanding of each of the four categories and their evolution
is necessary for a complete understanding of the process of FDA regulation of
2Statement of Policy for Regulating Biotechnology Products, Food and Drug Adminis-
tration, 51 Fed.Reg. 23,309 (1986). See also Curtis A. Kin, Coming Soon to the \Genetic
Supermarket" Near You, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1573 (July 1996); Peter Barton Hutt & Richard
A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law, Second Edition, Foundation Press, Inc., Westbury, New York,
1991.
3See 1991 FDA Guidelines, 56 Fed.Reg. 58,756 (1991). See also Tanya E. Karwaki, The
FDA and the Biotechnology Industry: A Symbiotic Relationship?, 71 Wash. L. Rev. 821
(July 1996).
5biotechnology.
A. Regulation of Drugs
Pure Food Congress rst granted FDA signicant authority to reg-
ulate drugs under the Pure
and Drugs
Act of 1906 Food and Drugs Act of 1906 (the \1906 Act").4 The 1906 Act
prohibited interstate
commerce in \adulterated" or \misbranded" drugs.5 The 1906 Act provided
for both civil and criminal penalties for violation of its provisions.6 A product
used in interstate commerce will constitute a \drug" under the 1906 Act if it was
either \recognized in the United States Pharmacopoeia or National Formulary
for internal or external use...[or] intended to be used for the cure, mitigation, or
prevention of either man or other animals."7Thus, the determination of whether
a product constitutes a \drug" under the 1906 Act turned in large part upon
the use of the product intended by the manufacturer.8 A drug was considered to
be \adulterated" under the 1906 Act if \it diers from the standard of strength,
quality, or purity" set forth in the Pharmacopoeia or Formulary, \if its strength
or purity fall below the professed standard or quality under which it is sold".9A
drug was considered to be \misbranded" if \it be an imitation of or oered for
434 Stat. 768 (June 30, 1906) (repealed in 1938).
5Pure Food and Drugs Act |1, 34 Stat. at 768.
6Id.
7Pure Food and Drugs Act | 6, 34 Stat. at 769, codied as amended at 21 U.S.C. |
321(g)(1)(B).
8This currently, in determining such \intended" use, FDA is \not bound by the manu-
facturer's subjective claims of intent but can nd actual therapeutic intent on the basis of
objective evidence. National Nutritional Foods Association v. Mathews, 557 F.2d 325, 334
(2d Cir. 1977).
9Pure Food and Drugs Act | 7, 34 Stat. at 769-70, codied as amended at 21 U.S.C. |
351(a)(1).
6sale under the name of another article...[or] if the contents...as originally put
up shall have been removed...and other contents shall have been placed in the
package, or if the package fail to bear a statement on the label of the quantity or
proportion of [certain enumerated substances].10Adulteration and misbranding
are considered separate violations and may be prosecuted separately or jointly.11
Criminal violations of the 1906 Act required a showing of intent or past viola-
tions of the Act.12 The 1906 Act granted FDA limited administrative authority
to ensure compliance with the requirements and prohibitions of the Act, autho-
rizing FDA to collect samples of drugs for analysis and seize any adulterated or
misbranded drugs.13
Sherley In 1911, the Supreme Court substantially limited the scope
of the 1906 Act by Amendment
of 1912 interpreting the denition of \misbranded" to prohibit only claims
that were false or
misleading as they related to the identity or ingredients of the drug mixture,
but not to prohibit false or misleading claims regarding the therapeutic eects
of a drug.14Congress remedied this limitation of the 1906 Act by enacting the
Sherley Amendment of 1912, which changed the denition of \misbranded"
10Pure Food and Drugs Act | 8, 34 Stat. at 770, codied as amended at 21 U.S.C. |
351(a), (j). The enumerated substances that were required to be disclosed in the labeling
were \alcohol, morphine, opium, cocaine, heroin, alpha or beta eucaine, chloroform, cannabis
indica, chloral hydrate, or acetanilide, or any derivative or preparation of any such substances".
Id.
11See e.g. United States v. Jamieson-McKames Pharms., 651 F.2d 532, 535 (8th Cir.
1981).
1221 U.S.C. | 333. See also Erica L. Niezgoda & Maureen M. Richardson, Federal Food
and Drug Act Violations, 35 Am. Crim. L.Rev. 767 (Spring 1998).
13Pure Food and Drugs Act || 10, 11, 34 Stat. at 771-2, codied as amended at 21 U.S.C.
| 360.
14U.S. v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488 (1911).
7under the 1906 Act to include a \package or label [that] shall bear or contain any
statement... regarding the curative or therapeutic eect of such article or any of
the ingredients or substances contained therein, which is false and fraudulent.15
Although this formulation fully addressed the concerns of the Supreme Court
that the 1906 Act did not grant authority to punish false statements of opinion,
the new denition of \misbranded" proved slightly problematic, as it possessed
the additional requirement that the seller actually be aware that the claims were
false (\false and fraudulent").
Although the 1906 Act, as amended by the Sherley Amendment, sketched
the initial framework for the regulation of drugs by FDA, with the development
of modern drugs, it soon proved inadequate to ensure public safety. In 1937, over
seventy people were poisoned to death as a result of ingestion of a drug known as
\Elixir Sulfanilamide".16The manufacturer of this \Elixir" dissolved the drug
sulfanilamide, a powder, in the solvent diethylene glycol in order to produce
a liquid preparation of the drug. Once the fatal product was identied, it
became clear that simple tests in animals, or even a review of published medical
literature, would have revealed the poisonous nature of the Elixir combination;
however, after the resultant deaths, the only basis of authority under the 1906
Act for FDA intervention to remove the Elixir from the public market was that
the preparation was not actually an \elixir" (a title which only strictly applies to
1537 Stat. 416, Ch. 352 (Aug. 23, 1912). See Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of
Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1735 (November 1996)
16Hutt & Merrill, supra, note 2, at 476.
8products utilizing an alcohol-based solvent) and that the product was therefore
misbranded.
Federal As a result of this incident, Congress realized that FDA
could not eectively
Food, Drug,
and safeguard the public against injury from adulterated products
through the 1906 Act
Cosmetic
Act of 1938 system of post-marketing review and testing, and, shortly
thereafter, Congress repealed the 1906 Act and enacted the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (the \1938 Act"), in order to provide FDA with au-
thority for premarketing review of drugs.17 The 1938 Act expanded the deni-
tion of drug to include \articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitiga-
tion, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals" and \articles
(other than food) intended to aect the structure or any function of the body
of man or other animals".18 The 1938 Act prohibited the introduction into
interstate commerce of any \new drug", which it dened as any \drug" that
was not \generally recognized, among experts qualied by scientic training
and experience to evaluate the safety of drugs, as safe for use under the condi-
tions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof".19Under
the 1938 Act, a manufacturer could only bring a \new drug" to market if the
drug was the subject of a new drug application (NDA) led with FDA that FDA
allowed to become eective.20In order to allow manufacturers to conduct clini-
1752 Stat. 1040, Ch. 675, codied as amended at 21 U.S.C. | 301 et seq. (June 25, 1938).
18Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act |201(g), 52 Stat. at 1041.
19Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act | 201(p)(1), 52 Stat. at 1,040-1. See also Merrill,
supra, note 16.
20Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act | 505(a), 52 Stat. at 1,052.
9cal trials on humans to collect sucient data to support an NDA application,
the 1938 Act authorized FDA to grant exemptions from this general prohibition
for \investigational drugs" that are the subject of an investigational new drug
application (IND) led with FDA.21 Additionally, the 1938 Act allowed FDA to
seek injunction against manufacturers instead of merely seizing oending prod-
ucts.22The 1938 Act expanded the denition of \adulterated" drugs, as well as
redening the term \mislabeled" to mean that the labeling was \misleading"
because it \fails to reveal facts material in the light of...representations [made
in the labeling] or material with respect to consequences which may result from
the use of the article to which the labeling relates".23This new denition of
\mislabeled" reected changes in the state of medical evidence and in the views
of courts toward FDA's exercise of misbranding jurisdiction. This new deni-
tion also solved the problems created by the Sherley Amendment by no longer
requiring FDA to present evidence concerning the intent or state of mind of the
manufacturer; FDA needed only demonstrate that the product did not meet the
claims of its labeling.
The 1938 Act, like the 1906 Act, provided for both criminal and civil penal-
21Drug Amendments | 103(b), 76 Stat. at 783, codied at 21 U.S.C. | 355(i).
22Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act | 302, 52 Stat. at 1,043.
23Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act | 201(n), 52 Stat. at 1041 (mislabeled). The 1938
Act dened \adulterated" as a drug that \(1) consists in whole or in part of any lthy, putrid,
or decomposed substance; or (2) if it has been prepared, packaged, or held under insanitary
conditions whereby it may have been rendered injurious to health; or (3) if...its container is
composed...of any poisonous or deleterious substance which may render the contents injurious
to health; or...[4] if its strength diers from, or its quality or purity falls below, the standard
set forth in [an ocial compendium]". Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act | 501(a), 52
Stat. at 1049.
10ties for violations of its provisions.24 In addition, courts added a strict liability
gloss to the 1938 prohibitions: a corporate ocer could be convicted for crimi-
nal violations of the 1938 Act without intent or past violations if the authority
possessed by that corporate ocer placed them in \responsible relation" to \the
furtherance of the transaction which the statute outlaws".25
The 1938 Act also increased the administrative authority of FDA to enforce
compliance with the requirements of the Act. The 1938 Act authorized FDA
to conduct inspections of drug manufacturing facilities.26Although FDA inspec-
tions were subject to reasonable time and manner limitations, the scope of such
an inspection can be very broad.27FDA inspectors are not required to state a
reason for conducting an inspection or to state any expected ndings.28FDA
inspectors may inspect all manufacturing areas of the facility, including con-
tainers and vehicles, may take batch samples, and may seize any oending
products.29While the 1938 Act signicantly increased the ability of FDA to
safeguard the public, the Act possessed several signicant problems. Under the
Act, a manufacturer could introduce a product into the market if the manufac-
turer itself believed that the product was \generally recognized as safe", leaving
2421 U.S.C. | 333.
25United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 285 (1943). See Niezgoda and Richardson, note
12, supra.
26Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act | 704, 52 Stat. at 1057.
27Id., also as codied at 21 U.S.C. | 374(a); Niezgoda and Richardson, supra, note 8.
28Id.
29Id., also as codied at 21 U.S.C. || 374(a), (c), and (d).
11FDA to contest the manufacturer's assessment. Even if manufacturers conceded
that a product was a \new drug" and thereby required the ling of an NDA,
FDA did not possess the authority to force the manufacturer to delay marketing
the product while FDA evaluated the NDA (beyond a 180 day statutory waiting
period), but merely possessed authority to declare an NDA ineective after its
evaluation. This second problem was compounded by the overwhelming volume
of NDAs submitted to FDA under the 1938 Act.30 When evaluating an NDA,
FDA was formally limited under the 1938 Act to considering only the safety
of the product, and not its therapeutic eectiveness. Once an NDA became
eective for a given product, other manufacturers began production of similar
versions of the product under the assumption that such generic, or \me-too",
drugs were also considered \generally recognized as safe" and thereby covered
under the pioneer NDA.
While the authority granted to FDA under the 1938 Act was in actuality limited
to assessment of only the safety of a \new drug", FDA reviewers often consid-
ered the therapeutic ecacy of the drugs as well.31 FDA took the position that
the concept of drug safety can be viewed as a risk-benet calculus, and, there-
fore, some consideration of ecacy|the benet in the calculus|is inherent in
the determination of safety. As a result, the concept of FDA statutory review
of ecacy was foreshadowed long in advance by administrative necessities.
The value of this informal FDA review of drug ecacy was highlighted by birth
defects caused by a new sedative introduced in Europe in 1957. This sedative,
30Within ve years after the passage of the 1938 Act, over 4,000 NDAs had been submitted
to FDA. Hutt & Merrill, supra, note 2, at 477.
31See Merrill, supra, note 16.
12Thalidomide, was widely prescribed to patients in Europe, including pregnant
women. The administration of Thalidomide to pregnant women resulted in a
variety of related children's birth defects known as phocomelia (in which the
most common defect was missing or highly-malformed limbs).32Thalidomide
was the subject of therapeutic trials before the FDA when its harmful eects
were discovered, and, consequently, was never released for use in the United
States.
Drug In the aftermath of the Thalidomide controversy, Congress
enacted the Drug Amendments
of 1962 Amendments of 1962 (the \1962 Amendments") in order to dramat-
ically expand the
authority of FDA.33This new regulatory system enacted in the 1962 Amend-
ments provided FDA with the authority to create the \modern" system of drug
regulation. The 1962 Amendments forbid the shipment in interstate commerce
of any new drug that was not the subject of an NDA approved by|and not
merely led with|FDA, thereby transforming the role of FDA from policeman
to gatekeeper.34The breadth of this prohibition, acting alone, prevented man-
ufacturers from conducting research on humans to demonstrate the safety and
ecacy of any new drug without the prior approval of FDA, because the ship-
ment of such new-but-unapproved drugs for use in humans would violate the
1962 Amendments. As under the 1938 Act, in order to allow manufacturers
32See Merrill, supra, note 16.
33Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780, codied as amended in various sections of 21 U.S.C.
(Oct. 10, 1962).
34Drug Amendments |104, 76 Stat. at 784, codied at 21 U.S.C. | 355(a).
13to conduct clinical trials on humans, the 1962 Amendments authorized FDA
to grant exemptions from this general prohibition for \investigational drugs"
that are the subject of an investigational new drug application (IND) led with
FDA.35
The 1962 Amendments explicitly directed FDA to conrm the eective-
ness of each new drug in addition to its overall safety, which dramatically
increased the scope of FDA approval power.36The 1962 Act required that a
manufacturer demonstrate the eectiveness of a new drug by \substantial evi-
dence...consisting of adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clin-
ical investigations".37 Because safety is evaluated on a product basis, an ap-
proved product is arguably safe for all uses; by contrast, ecacy is evaluated on
the basis of therapeutic purpose, thus FDA decided that each dierent therapeu-
tic use of a product requires individual approval under the 1962 Amendments.
This meant that all new therapeutic uses of a product required the pre-approval
of FDA by submission of a Supplemental New Drug Application (SNDA) by the
drug manufacturer.
The 1962 Amendments, by directing FDA to assess ecacy, also allowed FDA
to acquire eective control over the design and implementation of the clinical
trials process. Because the 1962 Amendments required FDA approval of a new
drug prior to marketing, manufacturers were forced to follow FDA directives in
35Drug Amendments | 103(b), 76 Stat. at 783, codied at 21 U.S.C. | 355(i).
36Drug Amendments | 102, 76 Stat. at 781, codied at 21 U.S.C. | 321.
3721 U.S.C. | 355(d).
14clinical experiment design and conduct, or risk disapproval by FDA. This NDA
approval power allowed FDA to dictate the design and scope of pre-clinical
research as well.
The modern clinical trial process as dened by FDA under the 1962 Amend-
ments possesses ve discrete stages. The initial (or \preclinical") phase consists
of laboratory research conducted in animals to demonstrate threshold safety
and therapeutic ecacy in order to support an IND application. IND applica-
tions must contain an identication of the active and inactive components of the
product, manufacturing data, proposed labeling, identication and experience
of the principal investigators, a limited environmental impact analysis, putative
therapeutic uses, preferred route of administration, a summary of all pharmaco-
logical and toxicological data and testing, and a proposal for a clinical research
protocol.38 Once an IND is led with FDA, manufacturers can commence the
rst set of experiments in humans.
Experiments in humans conducted under an eective IND are referred to as
\clinical trials". FDA has traditionally required that clinical trials take the form
of three separate research protocols, or \phases", although FDA by administra-
tive compromise often allows wide latitude in the design of the overall experi-
ments. The purpose of the rst set of research protocols, commonly referred to
as \Phase I" clinical trials, is to determine a \safe" dosage range, assess toxi-
3821 C.F.R. || 312.23, 355. See also Michael J. Malinowski & Maureen A. O'Rourke, A
False Start? The Impact of Federal Policy on the Genotechnology Industry, 13 Yale J. on
Reg. 163, 208 (Winter 1996); Sandra H. Cuttler, The Food and Drug Administration's Reg-
ulation of Genetically Engineered Human Drugs, 1 J. Pharmacy & L. 191, 198 (1992/1993).
15cology, and test various routes of administration of the compound, and Phase I
trials are normally conducted using completely healthy patients.39Phase I clin-
ical trials generally last less than one year and include less than one-hundred
patients.40Over two-thirds of drugs that enter Phase I clinical trials do not prove
safe or practical.41New drugs that demonstrate preliminary safety in healthy pa-
tients during Phase I trials are then tested in clinical trials involving patients
that possess the target disease that the drugs are intended to treat. This sec-
ond set of trials, called \Phase II" clinical trials, generally lasts less than two
years and involves 100 to 300 patients.42The purpose of Phase II clinical trials
is to determine an \eective" dosage range and to further assess toxicology and
administration in patients actually possessing the target disease. One-third of
drugs entering Phase II clinical trials do not prove eective or practical.43Drugs
that demonstrate preliminary safety and ecacy in Phases I and II, respectively,
then undergo a nal thorough set of clinical testing to in order to fully assess
the risks and benets of the drug, to discover any adverse eects resulting from
long-term administration, and to obtain all data necessary for complete and
accurate labeling of the ultimate product by physicians.44This nal set of clini-
39See Teresa Pechulis Buono, Biotechnology-Derived Pharmaceuticals: Harmonizing Re-
gional Regulations, 18 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 133 (Winter 1995); Malinowski and
O'Rourke, supra, note 27, at 208.
40Michael A. Friedman, M.D., Lead Deputy Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration,
Statement Before the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, United States House
of Representatives, April 22, 1998 (available on-line at www.fda.gov).
41Malinowski and O'Rourke, supra, note 27, at 209; see also Friedman, supra, note 29.
42Malinowski and O'Rourke, supra, note 27, at 209.
43Id.
44Id.
16cal trials, called \Phase III" clinical trials, often lasts over three years and can
involve up to several thousand patients.45 Normally, researchers work closely
with FDA when designing and conducting Phase III trials in order to ensure
that the research produces sucient data to adequately support the ultimate
application to FDA for approval to market the drug.
Upon completion of Phase III clinical trials, the data regarding the safety and
ecacy of the drug is submitted to FDA in the form of an NDA. The 1938
Act requires an NDA to contain a \full report" of the clinical trials research,
which FDA has interpreted to include a complete report of all clinical and pre-
clinical research, including the records of every patient involved in the research,
a list of all active and inactive components of the product to be marketed, a
statement of the composition of the active (drug) ingredient of the product, a
complete description of the methods of manufacture, processing, and packaging
of the product, copies of the proposed labeling for the product, and samples of
the product if requested by FDA.46In addition to requiring FDA to assess the
ecacy of all new drugs, the 1962 Amendment also required FDA, after a two-
year waiting period, to apply the ecacy standard to all drugs marketed prior to
1962. This requirement immediately posed two major diculties for FDA. First,
review panels appointed by FDA to assess the ecacy of drugs covered by NDAs
approved prior to 1962 found several thousand such drugs to be \ineective",
however, the 1962 Amendments granted the manufacturers of such drugs the
45Friedman, supra, note 40.
4621 U.S.C. |355(b)(1)(A); see also Merrill, supra, note 16, at 1784; Cuttler, supra, note
27, at 199.
17right to an administrative hearing prior to FDA disapproval of their previously-
approved NDAs.47FDA quickly realized that conducting several thousand such
administrative trials would be a practical impossibility. To circumvent these ad-
ministrative hearings, FDA issued administrative guidelines to redene both the
adequate design of clinical trials and the acceptable level of clinical data required
to support an NDA and to require that all NDAs be supported by ecacy data
matching the then-current clinical norms among academic researchers.48This
redenition had little, if any, eect upon pending clinical trials and NDA ap-
plications then before FDA, however, the redenition all but ensured that any
pre-1962 drug challenged by FDA would have inadequate clinical evidence sup-
porting ecacy to allow a lengthy administrative defense of the pre-1962 NDA.
The Supreme Court ultimately upheld FDA's reinterpretive tactic.49The second
major diculty in applying the ecacy standard to pre-1962 drugs involved
generic products marketed without FDA approval. Prior to 1962, once a pio-
neer NDA became eective for a given drug, other manufacturers often began
production of similar versions of the product under the assumption that all
such generic drugs were also covered under the pioneer NDA, and thereby were
\generally recognized as safe". Tens of thousands of generic products had been
marketed in this fashion prior to 1962.50Because these generic drugs were never
47Merrill, supra, note 16, at 1,770.
4835 Fed.Reg. 7,250 (1970); see also Merrill, supra, note 16, at 1,770. Note that the 1938
Act required an NDA to be supported by \substantial evidence...[including] adequate and
well-controlled...clinical investigations". 21 U.S.C. || 355(d)-(e).
49Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott, and Dunning, 412 U.S. 609 (1973)
50Merrill, supra, note 16, at 1,770.
18the subject of individual NDAs, FDA disallowance of a previously-approved pi-
oneer NDA, as described above, would have no eect upon generics, as they
never actually possessed any administrative approval to be disapproved.51Once
a pioneer NDA was disallowed, FDA could challenge each individual manufac-
turer in court to enjoin the sale of the generic product, however, FDA would
bear the burden of proof in each case and would have to challenge each product
individually. Again, FDA realized the practical impossibility involved in con-
ducting such administrative challenges. To resolve this problem, FDA took the
position that all generic drugs are administratively dependent upon the eec-
tiveness of the applicable pioneer NDA, thus disapproval of the pioneer NDA
would immediately result in disapproval of the related generics. The Supreme
Court ultimately upheld this position as well.52Further utilizing its increased
administrative authority granted under the 1962 Amendments, FDA expanded
its authority over drug manufacturers in two important areas. First, FDA as-
serted that all material modications to any aspect of an approved product
required prior approval from FDA, as any such change could eect the ecacy
of a product and thereby potentially invalidate the approval of its NDA.53Thus,
changes in labeling, methods of manufacture, and packaging must be reported
in addition to changes in the ingredients of the products. Manufacturers were
required to submit any such product changes as an Supplemental New Drug
51Id.
52USV Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Weinberger, 412 U.S. 655 (1973). See also Merrill, supra,
note 16, at 1,770.
53Merrill, supra, note 16, at 1,775.
19Application (SNDA) to FDA, a procedure which almost treated the product
changes as if they constituted a new therapeutic use for the product.
Second, FDA asserted that an approved product would be considered \adul-
terated", and thereby subject to disallowance and seizure, if the method of
manufacture of the product did not conform to a set of objective standards pro-
mulgated by FDA, regardless of the actual safety and ecacy of the product.
First published in 1963, these regulations, referred to as \current good manufac-
turing practices" (CGMPs), have been continually amended by FDA to reect
changes in technology and to contain specialized requirements for individual
categories of products.54 To further ensure compliance with CGMPs, FDA has
asserted that no SNDA will be approved unless the manufacturer complies with
all applicable CGMPs.55Thus, the implementation by FDA of the 1962 Amend-
ments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 dramatically altered
the administrative authority of FDA to regulate the sale and manufacture of
drugs. Prior to 1962, a manufacturer could bring to market any drug product
by any means of manufacture bearing any therapeutic claims unless FDA could
rst challenge the product and demonstrate that it was either unsafe or, in the
case of labeling, false. After the full implementation of the authority granted to
FDA in the 1962 Amendments, no manufacturer could market any drug prod-
uct unless that product and its active and inactive ingredients and methods of
5428 Fed. Reg. 6,385, now 21 C.F.R. Parts 210, 211. See also Merrill, supra, note 16, at
1787.
55See Merrill, supra, note 16, at 1787 and fn. 105. See e.g. 53 Fed. Reg. 18,905 (1988); 52
Fed.
Reg. 7,318 (1987); 52 Fed. Reg. 29,274 (1987).
20manufacture, packaging, and labeling were all rst approved by FDA as both
safe and eective, and then, after this pre-approval, the manufacturer could
not make any signicant change to the product or its methods of manufacture
or labeling without further pre-approval and could not fail to comply with all
CGMP procedures for the methods of manufacture of the product.
B. Regulation of Biologics
A \biologic" is any virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood,
blood component or derivative... applicable to the prevention, treatment, or
cure of diseases.56 Prior to 1902, the production of vaccines and other biologics
was left predominantly unregulated by the federal government.57 However, in
1901, antitoxin for the treatment of diphtheria produced from a horse infected
with tetanus caused the death of thirteen children in St. Louis, Missouri from
resulting tetanus infections.58
Biologics The public uproar surrounding this tragedy prompted Congress
to adopt the Control
Act of 1902 Biologics Act of 1902 (the 1902 Act).59The 1902 Act pro-
hibited the transportation or sale of biologics unless the manufacturer of the
biologics had received two separate licenses under the 1902 Act, an Establish-
5642 U.S.C. | 262
57In 1813, to deal with the problem of ineective smallpox vaccines, Congress adopted the
Virus Act of 1813, 2 Stat. 806 (1813); however, Congress repealed this Act nine years later,
determining that it would be \better to commit the subject altogether to the local authorities"
(3 Stat. 677 (1922)). Hutt & Merrill, supra, note 2, at 661.
58Philip D. Noguchi, M.D., From Jim to Gene and Beyond: An Odyssey of Biologics
Regulation, 51 Food & Drug L.J. 367, 368 (1996).
59Pub.L. No. 244, 32 Stat. 728 et seq. (1902).
21ment License and a Product License.60To obtain an Establishment License,
a manufacturer was required to submit an Establishment License Application
(ELA) describing the establishment and its facilities and delineating the areas
in which the manufacturing processes would take place, and, once an Estab-
lishment License was granted, the manufacturing establishment was required to
meet continuing \safety" and \purity" guidelines for the methods utilized in the
preparation of biologics.61An Establishment License could only be granted to a
full-scale establishment, and pilot or small-scale manufacturing facilities could
not be the subject of an ELA. To obtain a Product License, a manufacturer was
required to submit a Product License Application (PLA) describing the manu-
facturing process, testing, labeling, and packaging of the product, and, once a
Product License was granted, each container of biologic product was required
to be labeled with the address of the establishment and an expiration date for
the product.62Once an ELA and PLA were approved, a sample of each lot of a
biologic product produced was required to be submitted, along with testing data
for that lot, and the manufacturer could not begin distribution of the lot until
receiving a written notication of release.63Further, any change to either the
product or the facility in which that product was manufactured were required
to be submitted in a supplemental amended application.64
60Biologics Act | 1, 32 Stat. at 728.
61Id. See Hutt & Merrill, supra, note 2, at 679.
62Id. See Hutt & Merrill, supra, note 2, at 680.
63Id.
64Id.
22This system of dual licensing focused upon the methods of manufacture of
biologics as a proxy for guaranteeing their safety, and the 1902 Act did not
explicitly require manufacturers to demonstrate the ecacy or potency of the
actual biologics that they produced. However, as in the drug regulation context,
FDA implicitly read such an ecacy and potency into the regulation of biologics
under the 1902 Act by mandating in practice that the expiration dating require-
ment be fullled by actual clinical testing of biologics sucient to demonstrate
that the labeling date actually dened a functional eectiveness period, which
necessarily required a demonstration of some level of ecacy and potency for
any such period to exist.65 The 1902 Act granted authority to enter and in-
spect any establishment manufacturing biologics to ensure that the guidelines
for safety and purity are in eect.66The 1902 Act applies to biologic products
intended for use in humans, and Congress has adopted a separate act, the Virus,
Serum, and Toxin Act of 1913, to regulate veterinary biologic products; this act
is administered by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, a division
of the United States Department of Agriculture, and not by FDA.67
Public In 1944, Congress recodied the Biologics Act of 1902 as part
of the Public Health
Service Health Service Act of 1944 (the \1944 Act").68As with the 1902
Act, the 1944 Act Act of 1944
focused primarily upon extensive control over the methods of manufacture
65Noguchi, supra, note 46, at 368.
66Biologics Act | 3, 32 Stat. at 729.
67Edward L. Korwek, Human Biological Drug Regulation: Past, Present, and Beyond the
Year 2000, 50 Food & Drug L.J. 123 (1995).
68Pub.L. No. 85-410, 58 Stat. 682, 702 (1944), recodied at 42 U.S.C. | 262. See also
Hutt & Merrill, supra, note 2.
23of biologics as a proxy for ensuring purity and safety, and the 1994 Act main-
tained the ELA and PLA license system. However, in the 1944 recodication,
Congress explicitly added the requirement that biologics manufacturers demon-
strate \potency" as a measure of clinical usefulness.69 As under the 1902 Act,
the 1944 Act granted authority to enter and inspect any establishment man-
ufacturing biologics to ensure that the guidelines for safety and purity are in
eect.70The 1944 Act also allowed seizure of any biologics that were determined
to give rise to a substantial or imminent hazard to the public health.71As with
drug regulation, the 1944 Act provided for both civil and criminal penalties for
violations of its provisions.72
Consumer Throughout the life of the Public Health Service Act of
1944, Congress vested Safety Act
of 1972 the administrative authority for regulation of biologics in sev-
eral separate agencies. Administrative authority was originally granted to the
National Biological Institute (NBI) of the National Institutes of Health (NIH).
However, in 1955, a contaminated poliomyelitis vaccine produced by Cutter Lab-
oratories was rushed through the NBI approval process and released for general
use, which resulted in ten deaths and 192 cases of paralytic polio.73As a direct
result of this tragedy, administrative authority for the regulation of biologics was
transferred by Congress to the Division of Biological Standards (DBS), a newly-
6942 U.S.C. | 262. See also Noguchi, supra, note 46, at 368; Karwaki, supra, note 3.
7042 U.S.C. | 262(c).
7142 U.S.C. | 262(d)(2)(A). See also Korwek, supra, note 49, at 131.
7242 U.S.C. | 262(d)(2)(B) (civil); 42 U.S.C. s 262(f) (criminal). See also Cuttler, supra,
note 27, at 203.
73Hutt & Merrill, supra, note 2, at 665.
24created division of the NIH. DBS was criticized in several highly-publicized ar-
ticles in the journal Science as possessing both an amorphous, decentralized,
and often imprecise system for regulating biologics approvals and an inherent
conict of interest in that there often existed several putative strains of vaccine
developed to treat a given disease among which DBS must select a single can-
didate for approval and nationwide distribution, often with one of the several
such strains developed by in-house researchers at DBS.74 Amid this criticism,
an investigation of DBS conducted by the General Accounting Oce (GAO)
reported that, according to DBS records, 130 of the 221 total lots75 of inuenza
vaccine approved by DBS between 1966 and 1968 failed to meet the regulatory
standards for potency set by DBS itself.76 GAO also found that DBS was con-
sistently not applying the ecacy standards of the Drug Amendments of 1962
to biologic products. This GAO report, and subsequent hearings before the
Senate Subcommittee on Executive Reorganization and Goverment Research,
lead Congress to adopt the Consumer Safety Act of 1972, which transferred reg-
ulatory authority for the administration of the 1944 Act from NIH to FDA.77
To administer the requirements of the 1944 Act, FDA formed the Bureau of
Biologics.
74Hutt & Merrill, supra, note 2, at 666-7, citing Wade, Division of Biologics Standards:
Scientic Management Questioned, 175 Science 996 (1972).
75221 lots is approximately 67 million individual doses. Hutt & Merrill, supra, note 2, at
668.
76Hutt & Merrill, supra, note 2, at 668, citing Wade, DBS: Agency Contravenes Its Own
Regulations, 176 Science 34 (1972).
77Hutt & Merrill, supra, note 2, at 668, citing Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on
Executive Reorganization and Government Research of the Senate Committee on Government
Operations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). See also 37 Fed.Reg. 12,865 (June 29, 1975).
25Prior to 1972, regulation of biologics under NIH had focused primarily upon
the Public Health Service Act of 1944 and its requirements of safety, purity,
and potency, however, once administrative responsibility for the regulation of
biologics shifted from NIH to FDA, FDA announced its intention to require
that all new biologic products satisfy the additional standards of safety and e-
cacy mandated in the Drug Amendments of 1962, relying in large part upon its
authority under the misbranding provisions of the 1944 Act.78 Biologics, there-
fore, were to be required to meet safety, purity, potency, and ecacy standards
prior to FDA approval.79 Although this expansive reading of the misbranding
provisions of the 1944 Act seemed at rst blush to have greatly expanded the
evidentiary burdens placed upon biologics manufacturers, it should be noted
that, because the denition of a \drug" under the 1938 Act turns largely upon
the intended use of the product, the majority of biologic products actually fall
under the coverage of the 1938 Act.80
In an even more controversial exercise of its administrative authority, FDA
7821 C.F.R. | 601.25. See also Biological Products: Procedures for Review of Safety,
Eectiveness and Labeling, 38 Fed.Reg. 4319 (February 13, 1973) (proposed in 37 Fed.Reg.
16,679 (August 18, 1972)):
\Regardless of whether a particular biological product is a new drug, however, all biological
products are subject to the misbranding provisions of both section 502 of the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act and section 351(b) of the Public Health Service Act. A biological
product whose label purports, represents, or suggest it to be eective and/or safe for creetain
intended uses, and which is not safe and eective for such uses, is misbranded within the
meaning of both acts, and therefore should not and will not be licensed under section 351 of
the Public Health Service Act."
See also, Hutt and Merrill, supra, note 2, at 671; Korwek, supra, note 49, at 131.
79See Korwek, supra, note 49, at 126.
80Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act |201(g), 52 Stat. 728, 1041, codied as amended
at 21 U.S.C. | 321(g)(1)(B ): A product used in interstate commerce will constitute a \drug"
under the 1938 Act if it is \intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment,
or prevention of disease in man or other animals or...intended to aect the structure or any
function of the body of man or other animals."
26further announced its intention to apply the safety and ecacy provisions of the
1962 Amendments to all biologics that had already received prior approval from
NIH and to insist that all such prior-approved biologics additionally demon-
strate safety and ecacy.81FDA implemented this process, referred to as the
\Biologics Review", by dening multiple categories of biologics to be reexam-
ined, issuing requests for data from manufacturers of biologic products approved
in each such category, and appointing multiple advisory review panels to make
recommendations to FDA regarding the safety and ecacy of the reexamined
biologics.82The cross-application of the Public Health Service Act of 1944 and
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act of 1938 to products of biotech-
nology highlights some of the key dierences in the FDA regulatory schemes
for drugs and biologics, as it makes the requirements and enforcement powers
of each regulatory scheme applicable to a cross-regulated product. Biologics
are subject to license requirements, whereas drugs must be the subject of a
pre-approved NDA. Thus, even a fully-licensed establishment must delay pro-
duction of a product until the clinical trials process is complete and an NDA is
approved by FDA. Additionally, once an ELA license is granted, any change in
the method of manufacture of the product is presumed to adversely eect the
safety, purity, and potency of the product, though this would not be the case
for a product regulated solely as a drug. Because of this presumption, FDA has
81See Food and Drug Administration, Biological Products: Procedures for Review of Safety,
Eectiveness, and Labeling, 37 Fed.Reg. 16,679 (1972). See also Hutt & Merrill, supra, note
2, at 669.
82Id.
27traditionally insisted that there could not be an approved generic version of a
biologic product, which also makes the protections of the Drug Price Compe-
tition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, discussed below, inapplicable
to biologic drug products.83Further, FDA originally interpreted the ELA and
PLA provisions to require the same legal entity to hold both licenses, thus even
a product with a fully-approved NDA could only be produced at a fully-licensed
manufacturing establishment.84Also, biological products were subject to seizure
if FDA determines that a substantial or imminent risk to the public health ex-
ists, whereas products regulated solely as drugs would not be subject to seizure
unless the products were adulterated or misbranded.85
C. Regulation of Medical Devices
In contrast to the regulation of drugs and biologics, both of which have
been actively regulated for nearly a century, the regulation of medical devices
is much more recent. Though FDA has actually possessed authority to review
and regulate medical devices since 1938, the FDA did not at that time possess
pre-approval authority over medical devices, and thus FDA was required to
challenge individual device manufacturers in court.
83Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984), codied at 15 U.S.C. || 68b-c, 70b; 21 U.S.C.
|| 301, 28 U.S.C. | 2201, and 35 U.S.C. || 156, 271, 282; see infra. See also Korwek,
supra, note 49, at 126. FDA announced its determination of the inapplicability of the Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 to generic biologic products in
57 Fed. Reg. 17,950, 17,951 (1992).
84See 21 C.F.R. | 601.10(b).
85See 42 U.S.C. | 262(d)(2)(A) (seizure of biologics); 21 U.S.C. | 374(a), (c), and (d)
(seizure of drugs), both codied as amended.
28Prior to 1938, there existed a signicant number of machines and instruments
claimed to possess benecial medical properties or to assist in the treatment of
diseases, however, the majority of doctors and scientists at that time believed
that nearly all such claims were fraudulent or at best unsubstantiated.86
Federal In order to deal with the perceived threat of potential public
injury resulting Cosmetics
Act of 1938 from ineective or unsafe medical devices, Congress rst granted
FDA authority Food, Drug
and to regulate medical devices under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act of 1938 (the \1938 Act"),.87The 1938 Act dened \devices" as all
\instruments, apparatus, and contrivances...intended (1) for use in the diag-
nosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other
animals; or (2) to aect the structure or any function of the body of man or
other animals."88 As with the denition of \drug" under the 1938 Act, the de-
nition of \device" turned largely upon the intended use of the product, and thus
most instruments intended for use in medical care fell within this broad de-
nition.89 While the majority of medical machines and instruments existing in
1938 fell within this denition of a \device", the 1938 Act granted to FDA only
the limited authority to challenge medical devices that were \misbranded" or
\adulterated."90This limitation meant that FDA could not implement a system
of pre-market approval, as it had with drugs, or require that device manufac-
86Merrill, supra, note 16, at 1802.
8752 Stat 1040, Ch. 675, codied as amended at 21 U.S.C. | 301 et seq. (June 25, 1938).
88Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act |201(h), 52 Stat. at 1041.
89See Merrill, supra, note 16, at 1,801.
90Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act |301, 52 Stat. at 1042.
29turers demonstrate either the safety or the ecacy of their products. While
FDA did successfully challenge a large number of devices marketed with fraud-
ulent claims, often these devices merely reappeared with a new set of medical
claims.91 Thus, the 1938 Act did not provide FDA with the authority necessary
to fully regulate medical devices.
Drug Following the Thalidomide tragedy in 1957, FDA proposed
legislation to Amendments
of 1962 Congress that would grant FDA pre-market approval author-
ity over medical devices.92 However, as a result of political compromises in
Congress, FDA abandoned this proposal in order to ensure the adoption of the
Drug Amendments of 1962.93 While this compromise left FDA in its original
position of lacking adequate authority to fully regulate medical devices, the 1962
Amendments greatly increased FDA authority over drugs. The 1960's, however,
saw an explosion in the number and complexity of new medical devices, such as
pacemakers, heart valves, and kidney dialysis machines.94 Because of the com-
plexity and wide-spread use of such devices, as well as an increasing number of
deaths, infections, and manufacturer recalls resulting from unsafe or defective
devices, FDA believed that many such medical devices posed a signicant risk
to the public health, yet, because of the compromises surrounding the adoption
of the Drug Amendments of 1962, FDA did not possess the pre-market approval
91Merrill, supra, note 16, at 1803, citing Hutt & Merrill, supra, note 2, at 736-37.
92Peter Barton Hutt, A History of Government Regulation of Adulteration and Misbranding
of Medical Devices, 44 F.D.C. L.J. 99, 101-05 (1989). See also Merrill, supra, note 16, at 1804.
93Id.
94For a more extensive list of medical devices developed in the 1960's, see Hutt & Merrill,
supra, note 2, at 742-3.
30authority it believed necessary to suciently regulate devices.95 To overcome
this lack of pre-market approval authority, FDA began to leverage its newfound
drug authority to bolster the strength of its medical device regulation. FDA
utilized the expansive denition of the term \drug" in order to classify some
medical devices as \drugs", thereby allowing FDA to require both pre-market
approval and a demonstration of the ecacy of the device. When medical de-
vice manufacturers challenged FDA in court, FDA again found an ally in the
Supreme Court, which upheld this tactic of reclassication of certain medical
devices as drugs, as the Supreme Court had approved FDA's other expansive
implementations of the 1962 Amendments in the drug context.96 Mirroring
the Supreme Court's support for the expansion of FDA authority over med-
ical devices, President Nixon ordered the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare (HEW) to conduct a study of medical devices, publish a report
of its ndings, and propose legislative reforms, if necessary, to medical device
regulation under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act of 1938 for submis-
sion to Congress.97 To carry out President Nixon's directive, HEW appointed
Theodore Cooper, then Director of the Heart and Lung Institute, to head a
study group (commonly called the \Cooper Committee") to conduct this med-
ical device research.98 The Cooper Committee issued its report in September
95For several examples of 1960's medical devices that resulted in injuries, deaths, and man-
ufacturer recalls, see Hutt & Merrill, supra, note 2, at 743.
96United States v. An Article of Drug...Bacto-Unidisk..., 394 U.S. 784 (1969). Larry R.
Pilot & Daniel R. Waldmann, Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997:
Medical Device Provisions, 53 Food & Drug L.J. 267, 268 (1998). See also Merrill, supra,
note 16, at 1805; Hutt & Merrill, supra, note 2, at 731.
97President Richard Nixon, Consumer Message to Congress (1969). Pilot & Waldmann,
supra, note 76, at 268. See also Hutt & Merrill, supra, note 2, at 743.
98Id.
311970.99
Device As a direct result of this report (referred to as the \Cooper
Committee Amendments
of 1976 Report"), Congress ultimately passed the Device Amendments
of 1976 (the \1976 Amendments"), which amended the 1938 Act.100 The 1976
Amendments revised the denition of the term \device" to include any \instru-
ment, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or
other similar or related article....which does not achieve any of its principal in-
tended purposes through chemical action within or on the body of man or other
animals and which is not dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement
of any of its principal intended purposes."101 Congress intended this denition
to be broad enough to encompass both devices formerly classied as \drugs" by
FDA prior to the adoption of the 1976 Amendments and devices intended to
diagnose and treat purely physiological conditions not normally regarded as dis-
eases, such as pregnancy.102This broad denition made all such covered devices
subject to the general provisions of the 1938 Act, including adulteration and
misbranding regulations, Good Manufacturing Practice guidelines, limited es-
tablishment registration requirements, recordation and reporting requirements,
and seizure, inspection, and recall enforcement authority.103
99Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Study Group on Medical Devices, Medical
Devices: A Legislative Plan (September 1970). See also Pilot & Waldmann, supra, note 76,
at 268; Hutt & Merrill, supra, note 2, at 743.
100Pub.L. No. 94-95, 90 Stat. 539, codied in various parts of 21 U.S.C. (May 28, 1976).
101Device Amendments | 3(a)(1)(A), 90 Stat. at 575.
102Hutt & Merrill, supra, note 2, at 745.
103Codied severally in 21 C.F.R. Part 807 (establishment registration), 21 C.F.R. Part
820 (good manufacturing practices), 21 C.F.R. Part 803 (recordation and reporting), Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act | 518 (seizure, repair, and recall).
32The central thesis of the Cooper Committee Report had been that medical
devices were too diverse to allow a uniform system of regulation and that medical
devices instead should be grouped into categories possessing increasingly strin-
gent regulatory requirements based upon the potential risks to public safety and
health posed by the various medical devices; the 1976 Amendments drew upon
this thesis by requiring FDA to categorize all existing medical devices into three
separate regulatory classes.104 Medical devices of low risk to the public health
for which FDA determined that the general regulatory controls for devices were
\sucient to provide reasonable assurance of the safety and eectiveness of the
device" were categorized as Class I Devices under the 1976 Act and were subject
only to the general regulatory scheme of the 1938 Act existing prior to the 1976
Amendments, namely regulation of misbranding and adulteration.105Medical
devices for which FDA believed that mere misbranding and adulteration con-
trols were not adequate to ensure the public health were categorized either as
Class II Devices if sucient information existed to enable FDA to issue per-
formance and design standards for the manufacture of such devices or as Class
III Devices if existing information was insucient to allow FDA to establish
such manufacturing standards.106 Class II devices were subject to categorical
performance and manufacturing guidelines prescribing the functional features
and characteristics of all products of that type, whereas Class III devices were
104Device Amendments | 513, 90 Stat. at 540-2. See also Merrill, supra, note 16, at 1,807.
105Device Amendments | 513(a)(1)(A), 90 Stat. at 540. See also Hutt & Merrill, supra,
note 2, at 745.
106Device Amendments | 513(a)(1)(B), 90 Stat. at 541 (Class II); Device Amendments |
513(a)(1)(C), 90 Stat. at 541 (Class III). See also Hutt & Merrill, supra, note 2, at 745.
33subject to pre-market review for safety and ecacy, similar to the review of new
drugs.107 All new medical devices introduced subsequent to the adoption of the
1976 Amendments were to be classied as Class III Devices unless and until the
manufacturer could convince FDA to reclassify the new device.108 Additionally,
all devices categorized by FDA as \drugs" prior to the adoption of the 1976
Amendments were to be categorized as Class III devices.109
The pre-market approval process for Class III medical devices under the De-
vice Amendments of 1976 mirrors the analogous pre-market approval process
for drugs under Drug Amendments of 1962, with several notable dierences.
The 1976 Amendments prohibit the transportation in interstate commerce of
unapproved Class III medical devices unless such devices are subject to an \In-
vestigational Device Exemption" (IDE).110 The IDE is the functional equivalent
of the Investigational New Drug application, except that FDA will accept IDEs
based upon proposed Product Development Protocols that have been approved
by local institutional review boards if FDA determines that the device to be
tested does not pose a \signicant risk" to public health.111 Once clinical test-
ing is complete, the manufacturer of a device must le a Pre-Market Approval
(PMA) application with FDA, containing full and complete reports of all clini-
cal research conducted by the device manufacturer, in order to demonstrate the
107Merrill, supra, note 16, at 1,809.
108Device Amendments | 513(e). See also 42 Fed.Reg. 63,472 (December 16, 1977).
109Device Amendments | 513(e); Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act | 520(l)(2). See
also 42 Fed.Reg. 63,472 (December 16, 1977).
110Device Amendments | 520(g), 41 Fed.Reg. 35,282 (August 20, 1976), 43 Fed.Reg. 20,726
(May 12, 1978), 43 Fed.Reg. 25,142 (June 9, 1978), 45 Fed.Reg. 3,732 (January 18, 1980);
Hutt & Merrill, supra, note 2, at 756.
111Device Amendments | 520(g), 45 Fed.Reg. 6,255 (September 19, 1980).
34safety and ecacy of the device.112 In contrast to the NDA approval process,
the 1976 Amendments require FDA to consult with advisory committees prior
to approval of a PMA; in practice, FDA actually submits many drug NDAs to
similar advisory committees as well, however, this practice in the drug context
is purely voluntary on the part of FDA.113
Although a large number of new and existing medical devices were categorized as
Class III devices under the regulatory system created by the 1976 Amendments,
and thereby subjected to extensive pre-market approval requirements, the 1976
Amendments allowed two methods that manufacturers could utilize to reclassify
a medical device as Class I or II, thereby avoiding pre-market approval bars to
immediate marketing of the reclassied medical devices. First, any new medical
device that was \substantially equivalent" to a medical device marketed prior to
the adoption of the 1976 Amendments was reclassied to the same Class as the
pre-1976 \predicate" device, thus allowing the reclassication of the device to
avoid pre-market approval and requiring the reclassied device only to met the
performance and manufacturing standards (if any) set for the group of devices
into which the pre-1976 \predicate" device was categorized.114 To utilize the
\substantial equivalent" reclassication scheme (contained in section 510(k) of
the 1976 Amendments, and thus commonly referred to as the \510(k) process"),
at least ninety days prior to a manufacturer's intended date of market intro-
112Device Amendments | 515, 45 Fed.Reg. 81,769 (Dec.12, 1980), 51 Fed.Reg. 26,342 (July
22, 1986), codied in 21 C.F.R. Part 814.
113Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act | 513(a)(2)-(3), codied at 21 U.S.C. |
360c(a)(2)-(3) (1994). See Merrill, supra, note 16, at 1,821.
114Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act |510(k), as amended; Merrill, supra, note 16, at
1,811.
35duction of a new medical device, the manufacturer was required to notify FDA
both of its intention to so introduce the new medical device into the market and
of its reasons for concluding that the new device was substantially equivalent to
the pre-1976 predicate device.115This ninety-day notice requirement (referred
to as a \pre-market notication") provided FDA with a limited pre-market re-
view period in which to decide whether to accept the manufacturer's rationale
for equivalence or instead to conclude that the medical device possessed unique
features, properties, or uses sucient to require full pre-market review of the
medical device prior to marketing.116FDA further liberalized this reclassication
process by allowing manufacturers to claim substantial equivalence to devices
marketed after 1976 if such post-1976 device themselves had claimed a pre-
1976 device as a \predicate" for reclassication.117This second opportunity for
reclassication, commonly called \piggybacking", provided an ever-broadening
method for the reclassication of new medical devices.118 Indeed, the existence
of such expansive opportunities for exemption from the pre-market approval re-
quirement for devices, coupled with the fact that FDA did not propose a single
set of performance and manufacturing standards for Class II Devices for more
than a decade after the adoption of the 1976 Amendments, served to substan-
115Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act | 510(k) (codied as amended at 21 U.S.C. |
360(k) (1994)); Merrill, supra, note 16, at 1,811.
11621 C.F.R. |807.81 et seq., 41 Fed.Reg. 37,485 (September 3, 1976), 42 Fed.Reg. 42,520
(August 23, 1977). See Hutt & Merrill, supra, note 2, at 755. See also FDA, Guidance on the
Center for Devices and Radiological Health's Pre-market Notication Review Program (June
30, 1986).
117Merrill, supra, note 16, at 1,811, citing Letter from D. Bruce Burlington, Director, Center
for Devices and Radiological Health, Food and Drug Administration, to Presidents or Chief
Executive Ocers, Medical Device Manufacturing Companies (Nov. 1, 1995).
118Id.
36tially mitigate the eect of the adoption of the 1976 Amendments on device
manufacturers.119
The 1976 Amendments also contained provisions that prohibited states from
adopting regulations \dierent from, or in addition to, any requirements under
this Act"; while this state preemption went largely unnoticed when passed, it
would play a signicant role two decades later in shielding device manufacturers
that had plead guilty to violations of FDA regulations from state civil tort suits
which alleged per se negligence arising from such violations.120
Thus, the Device Amendments of 1976 provided FDA with the administra-
tive power necessary to build the modern system of device regulation. The 1976
Amendments also introduced the concepts of product classications, utilization
of institutional review boards, and consultation of expert advisory committees.
D. Regulation of Foods
Pure Food Congress rst granted FDA authority to regulate foods
in the Pure Food and And Drugs
Act of 1906 Drugs Act of 1906 (the \1906 Act").121 The 1906 Act
provides for both civil and criminal penalties for violation of its provisions.122
The 1906 Act prohibits the introduction, delivery, or receipt of any adulterated
or misbranded food in interstate commerce. The 1906 Act dened \food" as
119See Merrill, supra, note 16, at 1816.
120Jeery N. Gibbs, The Human Genome, FDA and Product Liability, 7 Risk: Health
Safety & Env't 267, 275 (Summer 1996).
12134 Stat. 728 (June 30, 1906) (repealed in 1938).
122Pure Food and Drugs Act | 1, 34 Stat. at 728.
37\all articles used for food, drink, confectionery, or condiment by man or other
animals, whether simple, mixed, or compound."123 The 1906 Act stated that
a food is \adulterated" if (1) \any substance has been mixed and packed with
it so as to reduce or lower or injuriously aect its quality or strength", (2) \if
any substance has been substituted wholly or in part for the article", (3) \if
any valuable constituent of the article has been wholly or in part abstracted",
(4) \if it be mixed, colored, powdered, coated, or stained in a manner whereby
damage or inferiority is concealed", or (5) \if it contain any added poisonous
or other added deleterious ingredient which may render such article injurious
to health".124 The 1906 Act denes a food as \misbranded" if (1) \it be an
imitation of or oered for sale under the name of another article", (2) \it be
labeled or branded so as to deceive or mislead the purchaser", (3) \the contents
of the package...have been removed...and other contents shall have been placed
in such package", (4) \it fail to bear a statement on the label of the quantity
or proportion of [certain enumerated substances]", or (5) if the label bears any
incorrect statement regarding \weight or measure" or any false or misleading
\statement, design, or device".125 The denition of \misbranded" was later
amended by Congress in 1913 to require food labeling to describe the contents
\in terms of weight, measure, or numerical count."126
12321 U.S.C. | 321(f).
124Pure Food and Drugs Act | 7, 34 Stat. at 770, codied as amended at 21 U.S.C. s 342(a).
125Pure Food and Drugs Act | 8, 34 Stat. at 770-1. ). The enumerated substances that
were required to be disclosed in the labeling were \alcohol, morphine, opium, cocaine, heroin,
alpha or beta eucaine, chloroform, cannabis indica, chloral hydrate, or acetanilide, or any
derivative or preparation of any such substances". Id.
12637 Stat. 732 (1913). See also Hutt and Hutt II, A History of Government Regulation of
Adulteration and Misbranding of Food, 39 F.D.C. L.J. 2, 58 (1984).
38Although the broad denition of \food" under the Pure Food and Drugs Act
of 1906 granted FDA extensive authority over nearly all types of food, several
specic categories of foods are regulated under additional Acts as well.127 Meat,
poultry, and eggs are regulated under the Federal Meat Inspection Acts of 1906
and 1907, the Poultry Products Inspection Act of 1957, and the Egg Products
Inspection Act of 1970.128 Most alcoholic beverages are regulated by the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms under the Federal Alcohol Administration
Act of 1935, though FDA also regulates alcoholic products as foods.129
While the 1906 Act gave FDA signicant authority to regulate foods, it pos-
sessed several shortcomings. First, the 1906 Act did not grant FDA authority
to inspect food manufacturing establishments.130Additionally, FDA could only
enforce the misbranding provisions of the 1906 Act against claims made in the
label of foods.131 The 1906 Act also did not adequately deal with products
that merely possessed ingredients of inferior quality or quantity without any
armatively misleading statement in its labeling, which has been termed \eco-
nomic adulteration".132 While the 1906 Act had granted USDA authority to
establish food standards for purity and content, FDA began to insist that ad-
equate enforcement of food regulations was not possible without the authority
127See generally J. H. Maryanski, FDA's Policy for Foods Developed by Biotechnology, Cen-
ter for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition Handout: 1995, American Chemical Society
Symposium Series No. 605 (1995) (Available on-line)
12821 U.S.C. |601 et seq., 21 U.S.C. |451 et seq., and 21 U.S.C. |1013 et seq., respectively.
See also, Hutt & Merrill, supra, note 2, at 34 (\USDA has ceded to FDA jurisdiction over
any food containing less than two percent of meat or poultry. The jurisdiction of USDA and
FDA over these three categories of food products is otherwise complex and uncertain.").
12949 Stat. 977 (1935). See Hutt & Merrill, supra, note 2, at 34-35.
130Hutt & Hutt II, supra, note 104, at 61.
131See Pure Food and Drugs Act | 8, 34 Stat. at 770-1.
132Hutt & Hutt II, supra, note 104, at 63.
39to establish mandatory standards of identity and quality of ingredients, as well
as mandatory requirements for the contents of food labeling.133
Federal To overcome these inadequacies in the regulation of foods
under the Pure Food Food, Drug,
And and Drugs Act of 1906, Congress included food regulation reforms
in the Federal Food, Cosmetics
Act of 1938 Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (the \1938 Act"), which
repealed the 1906 Act.134 The 1938 Act granted FDA's request for adminis-
trative authority to mandate standards for food identity and quality, limited
only by the requirement that such standards be reasonably tailored to promote
\honesty and fair dealing in the interest of consumers."135 This grant gave FDA
nearly unbounded authority to control the content of foods, and FDA utilized
this authority to hold illegal, whether by \adulteration" or \misbranding", any
food that did not conform to FDA food standards.136 The Supreme Court
upheld FDA's extensive use of such food standards to dene adulteration and
misbranding in 1943, however, the Court held that a product not conforming to
FDA's standards for ingredients could be marketed so long as it bore labeling
indicating that it was an \imitation" product.137 In addition, whereas the 1906
Act considered only foods with exogenous toxic substances to be adulterated,
the 1938 Act gave FDA the authority to seize foods that contained both en-
dogenous and exogenous toxic substances that would render the food injurious
133See FDA, Annual Report, 1933, Food Law Institute, Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Law Administrative Reports 1907-1949, at 13-16 (1933).
134See infra note 18. See also Michele J. Brace, Regulation of Genetically Engineered Foods
Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 33 Am. U.L. Rev. 899, 902 (Summer
1984).
135Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act | 401, 52 Stat. at 1046.
136Hutt & Hutt II, supra, note 104, at 65.
137Federal Security Administrator v. Quaker Oats Co., 318 U.S. 218 (1943).
40to the public health.138
The 1938 Act also required mandatory disclosures in the labeling of all foods;
food labels were required to contain the name and address of the manufacturer,
the net quantity of the contents, a statement of the ingredients, and the name of
the food; disclosure of this information was not required under the 1906 Act.139
FDA would later utilize the requirement that all foods labels bear the name of
the food in order to further extend its control over food contents and identity,
by prescribing requirements for the content of certain named foods and holding
misbranded all foods so labeled that did not meet these content requirements.140
This name-based requirements approach of FDA was upheld when challenged
in court.141
Food While the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act of 1938
granted FDA pre-Additives
Amendment market approval power for the regulation of drugs, it did not
grant FDA pre-market of 1958
approval power over foods, but merely the post-market enforcement power to
seize adulterated or misbranded foods. However, twenty years after the adoption
of the 1938 Act, Congress once again expanded the regulatory authority of FDA
over foods in the Food Additives Amendment of 1958 (the \1958 Amendment"),
138Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act | 402(a), 52 Stat. at 1046, codied as amended
at 21 U.S.C. | 342(a)(1). See Brace, supra, note 111, at 905-906. See also United States v.
Lexington Mill & Elevator Co., 232 U.S. 399 (1914) (nding that \adulteration" under the
1906 Act required a showing of an injurious quantity of the toxic substance present in the
food, and not merely the presence of the toxic substance).
139Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act | 403, 52 Stat. at 1047. See Hutt & Hutt II,
supra, note 104, at 67.
140See 37 Fed.Reg. 12,327 (June 22, 1972); 38 Fed.Reg. 6,964 (Mar. 14, 1973); 21 C.F.R.
Part 102; Hutt & Hutt II, supra, at 69.
141American Frozen Food Institute v. Califano, 555 F.2d 1,059 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
41which granted FDA pre-market approval power over all food additives.142 The
1958 Amendment adopted the \generally recognized as safe" approach of the
1938 Act, dening a \food additive" as all exogenous substances added to food
that are not \generally recognized as safe" for human consumption.143 All
foods containing unapproved food additives were considered \adulterated" and
thereby subject to seizure.144 All food substances that had been approved
by FDA prior to 1958 were grandfathered under the 1958 Amendments and
exempted from the denition of a \food additive".145 As with the treatment
of \me-too" drugs under the 1938 Act, approval by FDA of a food additive as
\generally recognized as safe" meant that all food producers could use that food
additive without pre-market approval from FDA.146
III. The Struggle for Form: Asilomar and Uncertainty (1973-1983)
The rst three-quarters of the twentieth century saw a dramatic increase
in the extent and strength of FDA administrative authority to regulate drugs,
biologics, devices, and foods. Where such authority was unsettled, inadequate,
and often non-existent at the dawn of the century, by the late 1970s, FDA pos-
sessed the authority necessary to build its system of four strong, though highly
variable, regulatory frameworks designed to safeguard the public health against
unsafe, ineectual, and unsuitable drugs, biologics, devices, and foods. In de-
142Pub. L. No. 85-929, 72 Stat. 1,784 (1958), codied at 21 U.S.C. | 348 (1982). See Brace,
supra, note 111, at 907.
14321 U.S.C. | 321(s) (1982).
14421 U.S.C. | 348(a) (1982).
14521 U.S.C. | 321(s)(4) (1982).
146See Brace, supra, note 112, at 907.
42termining within which administrative framework(s) the new product would be
regulated, however, this FDA system looked primarily to the intended use to
which a manufacturer planned to put a new product and all but ignored the
process of development and method of manufacture of a new product. It was
against this regulatory backdrop that a revolutionary new method for the devel-
opment and manufacture of new products emerged that would test the stability
and practical limitations of the FDA regulatory system.
For the rst time, in 1973, two scientists inserted a gene from an animal, a toad,
into a bacterium and successfully caused this toad gene to function inside the
bacterium. This experiment marked the beginning of the era of recombinant
genetics and biotechnology. The results of these experiments were presented
to colleagues at the Gordon Research Conference on Nucleic Acids in July of
1973. In response to the announcement of the success of these experiments,
and their shocking implications, the scientists in attendance at this conference,
a group of the most prominent academic biologists, co-authored a letter to Dr.
Philip Handler, President of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), and Dr.
John Hogness, President of the Institute of Medicine, NAS, requesting that all
research into the new eld of recombinant genetics be subject to government
regulation, that there be a moratorium on all such research until an interna-
tional conference could be called to assess the potential hazards that could result
from recombinant technology, and that NIH establish a committee to provide
advice and establish guidelines for such research. This letter was later published
43in the journal Science.147 The publication of this letter focused immense public
attention and debate on the correct method for controlling biotechnology.
In response to this public attention, the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
established the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC) in 1974 to over-
see research in recombinant technology.148NIH directed RAC to formulate guide-
lines, to be released by NIH, for the conduct of research in recombinant genetics.
In 1975, following the suggestion of the Science co-authors, an international con-
ference was held at the Asilomar Conference Center in Pacic Grove, California,
to consider the implications of recombinant genetics. The scientic consensus of
the Asilomar conference, published in the 1975 Summary Statement of the Asilo-
mar Conference on Recombinant DNA Molecules149(the \1975 Statement"), was
that only a few types of genetic experiments should not be performed and that
the vast majority of research could continue under appropriate physical and bi-
ological safeguards.150 The 1975 Statement called upon NIH to issue guidelines
to implement the suggestions of the Asilomar conference.151 At the rst meet-
ing of RAC, held in San Francisco shortly after the Asilomar conference, RAC
147Berg, Baltimore, Boyer, Cohen, Davis, Hogness, Nathans, Roblin, Watson, Weissman &
Zinder, Potential Biohazards of Recombinant DNA Molecules, 181 SCIENCE 1114 (1973)
(hereinafter Berg et al.). See also Valerie M. Fogleman, Regulating Science: An Evaluation
of the Regulation of Biotechnology Research, 17 Envtl. L. 183 (Winter 1987).
148RAC possesses authority to regulate only recombinant DNA technology, which requires
two pieces of DNA spliced|or recombined|outside of a living organism. National Institutes
of Health, Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee; Meeting, 49 Fed. Reg. 696, 697 (1984).
See Fogleman, supra, note 125, at 206.
1491975 Summary Statement of the Asilomar Conference on Recombinant DNA Molecules
188 Science 991 (1975), 225 Nature 442 (1975), 72 Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences 1981 (1975).
150See Donald S. Fredrickson, Director, NIH, Introductory Statement to the Recombinant
DNA Research Guidelines, 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902, 27,902 (1976).
151Id.
44proposed that NIH follow the suggestion of the Asilomar conference members
and base the NIH guidelines for genetic research upon the recommendations
contained in the 1975 Statement.152
NIH In 1976, NIH released the NIH Recombinant DNA Research
Guidelines (the Recombinant
DNA \NIH Guidelines"), which set out mandatory research protocols and
limitations for all Research
Guidelines research institutions receiving NIH funding to conduct research
in recombinant (1976)
genetics.153The NIH Guidelines implemented the suggestions of the 1975
Statement, as RAC had suggested. The NIH Guidelines prohibited several cat-
egories of genetic experimentation, including the unauthorized release of all
genetically-altered organisms, dened physical and biological containment pro-
cedures for sets of genetic research protocols, dened in detail the responsibili-
ties and liabilities of all members of a research team and sponsor organization,
and mandated the formation of an Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) at
every research institution receiving NIH funding to ensure compliance by the
institution with the provisions of the NIH Guidelines.154The NIH Guidelines
dened \recombinant DNA" as \molecules that consist of dierent segments of
DNA which have been joined together in cell-free systems, and which have the
capacity to infect and replicate in some host cell, either autonomously or as an
integrated part of the host's genome."155 The NIH Guidelines dened four
152Fredrickson, supra, note 128, at 27,903.
153Recombinant DNA Research Guidelines, 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902 (1976).
154Id. See Fogleman, supra, note 125, at 208; See also 41 Fed. Reg. 27,911 (1976).
15541 Fed. Reg. at 27,911 (1976).
45levels of physical containment, designated \P1" through \P4", whose applica-
tion varied with the hazard posed by the type of research.156P1, or \minimal",
physical containment was suitable only for a laboratory that was \commonly
used for microorganisms of no or minimal biohazard", and P1 physical controls
involved only \standard microbiological practices".157Laboratories conducting
\experiments involving microorganisms of low biohazard" were required to im-
plement P2, or \low", physical containment protocols, which included closed
laboratory spaces, restricted access, daily decontamination of work surfaces, ac-
cess to autoclave sterilization equipment, and use of laboratory gowns, coats,
and uniforms.158Experiments of \medium" biohazard were required to imple-
ment P3 physical containment, which required most P2 controls and controlled
entry, directional airow, no work involving genetic hosts in open vessels on the
open bench, posting of biohazard warning signs, decontamination of work areas
after every experiment, and mandatory use of gloves.159P4, or \high", physical
containment was required for work with \microorganisms that are extremely
hazardous to man and may cause serious epidemic disease"; P4 required most
P3 controls and monolithic walls, sealed ducts and conduits, entry by air locks,
contiguous clothing change and shower rooms, double-door autoclave steriliza-
15641 Fed. Reg. at 27,912 (1976). These four physical containment levels were based upon
recommendations contained in the 1975 Statement, supra, note 127, which adopted the four
levels dened in Classication of Etiologic Agents on the Basis of Hazard (4th Edition, July
1974), U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public Health Service, Center for
Disease Control, Oce of Biosafety, Atlanta, Georgia, 30333.
157Id.
15841 Fed. Reg. at 27,913 (1976).
159Id.
46tion equipment, maintenance of negative air pressure, exhaust treatment sys-
tems, and no removal of materials without sterilization.160 In addition to sep-
arating experiments into categories of physical containment requirements, the
NIH guidelines divided research protocols into specied experimental guidelines,
based upon the genetic host (referred to in biology as a \vector") and the source
of the inserted DNA.161First, the experimental guidelines listed a set of six cat-
egories of experiments that were never to be performed; these experiments in-
cluded the cloning of recombinant DNA from certain pathogenic organisms and
oncogenic viruses, deliberate formation of recombinant genes for the biosynthesis
of potent toxins, deliberate creation of plant pathogens with increased virulence
or host range, deliberate transfer of drug resistance to microorganisms, certain
large-scale experiments, and the deliberate release into the environment of any
organism containing a recombinant DNA molecule.162The NIH Guidelines de-
ned the relevant research vector categories as E. Coli K-12 vectors, puried
cellular DNA vectors, plasmid, bacteriophage, and viral vectors, prokaryotic
host vectors, and eukaryotic host vectors (which include subclasses of animal
vectors, plant vectors, and fungal and other lower eukaryotic vectors).163The
NIH Guidelines dened the relevant categories of sources of recombinant DNA
as randomized shotgun clones, characterized shotgun clones, eukaryotic recom-
binants, prokaryotic recombinants, animal viruses, plant viruses, and eukaryotic
160Id.
161See 41 Fed. Reg. at 27,914 (1976).
16241 Fed. Reg. at 27,914-5 (1976).
16341 Fed. Reg. at 27-914-20 (1976).
47and prokaryotic organelle recombinants.
Two years later, NIH revised the NIH Guidelines.164The revised NIH Guide-
lines possessed a slightly altered denition of \recombinant DNA". 165 The cat-
egories of prohibited experiments were maintained, including the prohibition on
the deliberate release into the environment of any organism containing a recom-
binant DNA molecule, however, the revision added a process whereby specic
experiments could be exempted from the prohibition on a case-by-case basis if
expressly approved by the Director of NIH and by RAC after notice and op-
portunity for public comment.166 The revised NIH Guidelines also retained the
system of classication of physical containment procedure levels (P1-P4) and bi-
ological containment classications, however, the revisions relaxed some of the
requirements of these categories and expanded the class of exempt experimental
protocols, in recognition of a greater familiarity with the hazards posed by cer-
tain recombinant DNA techniques.167 In particular, the revised NIH Guidelines
identied ve categories of recombinant DNA that would be exempt from the re-
quirements of the NIH Guidelines, concluding that these experiments \present
164Recombinant DNA Research, Revised Guidelines, 43 Fed. Reg. 60,080 (1978), proposed
in 43 Fed. Reg. 33,042 (1978). The revised NIH Guidelines state the reason for the 1978
revision as: \Since the issuance of the 1976 guidelines, recombinant DNA techniques have
become much more widely used in research and more has been learned about the limits of
potential risks in using this technology. In light of this new knowledge, the Director, NIH, on
July 28, 1978 proposed substantial modication and relaxation of the guidelines."
16543 Fed. Reg. at 60,108 (1978): \In the context of these Guidelines, recombinant DNA
molecules are dened as either (i) molecules which are constructed outside living cells by
joining natural or synthetic DNA segments to DNA molecules that can replicate in a living
cell, or (ii) DNA molecules that result from the replication of those described in (i) above."
16643 Fed. Reg. at 60,108 (prohibitions), at 60,127 (case-by-case exemptions) (1978).
167See Diane E. Homann, The Biotechnology Revolution and Its Regulatory Evolution, 38
Drake L. Rev. 471 (1988/1989).
48no known health risk";168 the ve exempted categories included recombinant
DNA that was not contained in an organism or virus, that was derived solely
from a single non-chromosomal or viral DNA source, that was derived from
and propagated only in a single host organism, certain DNA segments (listed
in an appendix to the NIH Guidelines and periodically updated by RAC) from
multiple species that exchanged DNA by known physiological processes, and
any other class of DNA segments found by the Director of the NIH, after RAC
review and public comment, to \not present a signicant risk to health or the
environment). This expanded exemption was especially signicant in that these
ve categories of experiments together accounted for approximately one-third
of the research that had been covered by the 1976 version of the NIH Guide-
lines.169
Although the NIH Recombinant DNA Research Guidelines did set out an initial
system for the regulation of biotechnological research, the NIH Guidelines were
widely criticized as inadequate. First, the NIH Guidelines were only binding
upon institutions that conducted recombinant genetic research under the aus-
pices of an NIH grant, and institutions that did not receive funding from NIH
were not bound by the restrictions in the NIH Guidelines.170Many corporations
voluntarily agreed to adhere to the majority of the NIH Guidelines, however,
most of these corporations refused to adhere to the prohibitions on large-scale
16843 Fed. Reg. at 60,080 (1976).
169Id.
17043 Fed. Reg. at 60,123 (1976) (\The Guidelines are applicable to all recombinant DNA
research...conducted at or sponsored by an Institution that receives any support for recom-
binant DNA research from NIH.").
49research involving recombinant organisms.171To address these refusals, in 1980,
NIH issued the Physical Containment Recommendations for Large-Scale Uses of
Organisms Containing Recombinant DNA Molecules, which, though not bind-
ing, was meant to provide guidance for large-scale recombinant DNA experi-
ments by private institutions.172Additionally, a few local governments from ar-
eas containing large research institutions adopted legislation mandating compli-
ance with the NIH Guidelines for all research involving recombinant genetics.173
Second, even when the NIH Guidelines did apply to an institution, the only
sanction that NIH could impose for violations under the NIH Guidelines was to
withdraw NIH funding for research at the institution.174 In an eort to bolster
the enforcement powers of NIH under the NIH Guidelines, most other federal
funding agencies agreed to require compliance with the NIH Guidelines by their
recipient institutions as a condition precedent for continued funding.175 Third,
the NIH Guidelines did not apply to research utilizing genetic techniques other
than recombinant DNA protocols or to genetically-modied organisms created
by those techniques.176Finally, the NIH Guidelines did not set out an adequate
171See Thomas O. McGarity & Karl O. Bayer, Federal Regulation of Emerging Genetic Tech-
nologies, 36 Vand. L. Rev. 461 (April 1983), citing Hearings on Science Policy Implications
of DNA Recombinant Molecule Research Before the Subcommittee on Science, Research and
Technology of the House Committee on Science and Technology, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 91,374
(1977) (testimony of Dr. Ronald E. Cape, president, Cetus Corporation and testimony of
John G. Adams, vice president for scientic and professional relations, Pharmaceutical Man-
ufacturers Association).
172Physical Containment Recommendations for Large-Scale Uses of Organisms Containing
Recombinant DNA Molecules, 45 Fed. Reg. 24,968 (1980).
173See 43 Fed. Reg. at 60,123 (1976).
174See Fogleman, supra, note 125, at 207.
175McGarity & Bayer, supra, note 149, at note 137, citing Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on Health and the Environment of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 320, 327 (1977) (testimony of Dr. Donald B. Fredrickson, Director, NIH).
176See note 126, supra.
50system for regulating the controlled release of recombinant organisms.
In 1979, NIH was directed to prepare an NIH Risk Assessment Plan detail-
ing the current consensus regarding known risks and hazards for all research in
biotechnology.177To accomplish this task, NIH instituted the Program to Assess
the Risks of Recombinant DNA Research, which was to issue annual reports of
its ndings.178These risk assessments concluded that there was an extremely
low probability that recombinant organisms would infect humans.179The NIH,
therefore, considered both making compliance with the NIH Guidelines volun-
tary and eliminating the NIH Guidelines entirely.180These proposals were met
with strong public disfavor and were withdrawn by NIH in favor of more lenient,
yet binding, NIH Guidelines, which removed deliberate release experiments from
the category of prohibited research.181Beginning in 1980 and continuing for sev-
eral years, the NIH Guidelines were revised on an almost annual basis, in order to
reect changes in the status of knowledge regarding the risks posed by biotech-
nology.182 While these revisions kept the NIH Guidelines current with respect
to advances in biotechnology, they did not resolve any of the above-described
177Fed. Reg. on Sept. 13, 1979.
178Id.
179National Institutes of Health, Program to Assess the Risks of Recombinant DNA Re-
search: Proposed First Annual Update, 45 Fed. Reg. 61,874 (1980). See McGarity & Bayer,
supra, note 150, at 464.
180See Recombinant DNA Research: Proposed Revised Guidelines, 46 Fed.Reg. 59,368
(1981). See Homann, supra, note 146, at 489. See also McGarity & Bayer, supra, note
150, at 465, citing NIH Unit Votes to Ease but Retain Federal Rules on Gene-Splicing, Wash.
Post, February 9, 1982, at A7, col. 4.
181Id.
182The most signicant of these revisions were 46 Fed. Reg. 59,368 (1981); 49 Fed.Reg.
46,266 (1984); 51 Fed. Reg. 16,958 (1986).
51criticisms regarding the architecture of NIH regulation of biotechnology, and
the end result of these constant modications was to make the NIH Guidelines,
in the words of the Director of NIH, \long, cumbersome, and detailed."183 Al-
though many agreed that that the NIH Guidelines were over-detailed, it would
be the lack of adequate detail regarding direct release experiments that would
ultimately shift the focus of the regulation of biotechnology away from the NIH
Guidelines.
During this period, FDA did not announce any ocial new policies regarding
its regulation of products resulting from biotechnology. FDA initially embraced
the NIH Guidelines and proposed their incorporation into the requirements for
the design and conduct of clinical trials for products derived from biotechnol-
ogy.184However, amidst the criticisms of the NIH Guidelines and the tendency of
NIH to greatly relax the requirements contained therein with each revision, FDA
quickly retreated from this initial position.185Instead, FDA implicitly began to
adopt the position that no new product categories or signicant administrative
changes were need to regulate the products of biotechnology, but, that all prod-
ucts derived from biotechnology must undergo the entire applicable FDA review
process anew regardless of whether prior manufacturers had received approval
of applications covering the non-biotechnological equivalents of the products.186
183Fogleman, supra, note 126, at 209, citing Evaluation of the Risks Associated with Recom-
binant DNA Research, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,385, 59,391 (1981).
18443 Fed. Reg. 60,134 (1978).
185See McGarity & Bayer, supra, note 150, at 519-20.
186See Id. at 519, citing Miller, Proceedings of the Banbury Conference on the Medical
Application of Recombinant DNA (1983).
52IV. The Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotech-
nology (1984 - 1986)
In the early 1980s, several incidents involving government regulation and
approval of biotechnology created intense public concern regarding the safety
of the products of biotechnology, the potential moral and economic impacts of
seemingly-unchecked advances in biotechnology, and the ability of the existing
government framework to adequately regulate advances in biotechnology.
First, in 1980, the Supreme Court held, in a controversial 5-4 decision, that a
modied Pseudomonas bacterium possessing the genetically-engineered capabil-
ity to break down multiple components of crude oil, designed for use in managing
oil spills, was patentable subject matter.187This decision raised intense religious
and ethical objections to the ownership of life and created a public sense of
unease regading the direction and implications of biotechnological research.
In 1982, FDA approved the rst biotechnology drug, recombinant human in-
sulin.188Human insulin is a protein involved in the regulation of sugar metabolism,
and a person producing insucient levels of insulin is aicted with the disease
diabetes.189FDA approved the NDA for recombinant insulin in record time, the
187Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). See also Senator Al Gore (United States
Senator, D-Tennessee), Planning a New Biotechnology Policy, 5 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 19, 21
(1991).
188See Ann Gibbons, Biotech pipeline: bottleneck ahead; a vast array of new genetically
engineered
drugs are heading for market - but an FDA backlog is holding them up, Science Vol. 254,
No. 5,030, pg. 369 (October 18, 1991) (available online as 1991 WL 4850080).
189See Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 43
U.S.P.Q.2d 1398 (Fed.Cir.(Ind.), Jul 22, 1997).
53period from NDA submission to approval taking only ve months.190Prior to
the advent of biotechnology, diabetes was treated by injecting patients with
puried animal insulin, which, because it was not identical to human insulin,
often caused allergic reactions in patients.191Recombinant human insulin, by
contrast, could be constructed to be exactly identical to human insulin, and
thereby eliminate these allergic reactions.192Then, in 1983, NIH and EPA to-
gether rst approved several requests for authorization to conduct experiments
involving the direct release into the environment of genetically-modied organ-
isms. The rst of these approvals was granted to Agracetus to conduct tests
of a genetically-modied tobacco plant, discussed in detail later in this pa-
per.193Shortly thereafter, NIH approved the environmental release of two re-
combinant bacteria developed by researchers at the University of California at
Berkeley and Advanced Genetic Sciences, Inc. (AGS). These researchers found
that two strains of naturally-occurring bacteria, Pseudomonas syringae and Er-
winia herbicola, commonly found on strawberry and potato plants, produced
surface proteins that encouraged the formation of ice particles and that, in the
absence of these bacteria, strawberry and potato plants could survive at tem-
peratures as low as twenty-ve degrees Farenheit, whereas such plants in the
presence of these bacteria died of frost damage at thirty-two degrees.194These re-
190Gibbons, supra, note 182.
191Id.
192Id.
193This approval is discussed in detail infra.
194William A. Anderson, II, Biotechnology and the Environment: The Regulation of Genet-
ically Engineered Organisms Used in the Environment, Current Litigation Issues Associated
54searchers created deletion, or \knock-out", recombinant strains of each of these
bacteria that did not produce this frost-inducing surface protein, in the hopes
that crops could be sprayed with recombinant \Ice-Minus" bacteria in order to
protect the crops against frost formation.195AGS submitted a request to RAC
and EPA for authorization to conduct direct release experiments under the NIH
Guidelines, and NIH and EPA approved the application, scheduling the direct
release experiment to begin in May of 1984. In September of 1983, prior to the
planned start of these direct release experiments, however, the NIH approval
was challenged in court on the grounds that NIH had violated the National
Environmental Protection Act of 1969 (NEPA), because NIH had failed to pre-
pare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) assessing the environmental
impact of the revisions in the NIH Guidelines that removed direct releases of
recombinant organisms from the \prohibited" category of experiments prior to
authorization of the \ice-minus" experiment.196The District Court, in May of
with Biotechnology, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. 10503, 10,504 (1989); Charles Weiner, Is Self-Regulation
Enough Today?: Evaluating the Recombinant DNA Controversy, 9 Health Matrix 289, 299
(1999).
195Id.
196Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 153 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. | 4321 et seq. (1982). NEPA requires
NIH to compile an environmental impact report, called an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS), prior to the approval of all major [NIH] actions signicantly aecting the quality of the
human environment, in order to access the impact of such actions on the environment. This
EIS report must include a \detailed statement" which discusses:
\(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental eects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be
implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the mainte-
nance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved
in the proposed action should it be implemented."
42 U.S.C. |4332(2)(C). See Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 587 F.Supp. 753
(D.D.C., May 16, 1984), at 756. See also Allen, supra, note 164, at 547.
551984, less than ten days prior to the scheduled start date of the \Ice-Minus"
eld tests, held that NIH had violated NEPA by not compiling an EIS re-
port, and the court enjoined all direct release experiments approved by NIH,
which included both the \Ice-Minus" and Agracetus tobacco experiments.197
On appeal of the District Court ruling against NIH and AGS, the Court of Ap-
peals armed the injunction barring the \Ice-Minus" experiment, however, the
court vacated the District Court's injunction prohibiting NIH from continuing
to approve other direct release experiments, which allowed NIH to continue ap-
proval of direct release applications on a case-by-case basis.198These incidents
served to created some public discomfort regarding the rapid advancement of
biotechnology. In addition, NIH, in reliance on its risk assessment data, had
continued to relax the regulatory requirements governing biotechnology under
the NIH Guidelines throughout the early part of the 1980s. Companies con-
ducting research in biotechnology began to complain about the inexperience
of the various administrative agencies with biology and the patchwork maze
of regulation that resulted. In 1984, these diverging viewpoints on the proper
strength and framework for the regulations governing biotechnology aroused the
attention of Congress and the President, and, in the words of then Senator Al-
bert Gore, NIH \virtually relaxed itself out of a job."199In 1984, the President's
Council on Natural Resources and the Environment (now the Domestic Policy
197Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 587 F.Supp. 753 (D.D.C., May 16, 1984).
198Anderson II, supra, note 168, at 10,504. See also Linda Maher, The Environment and the
Domestic Regulatory Framework for Biotechnology, 8 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 133, 143 (1993).
199Gore, supra, note 161, at 19.
56Council) established the Domestic Policy Council Working Group on Biotech-
nology, commonly referred to as the Working Group, under the Oce of Science
and Technology Policy (OSTP), to develop a coordinated system for regulating
biotechnology. 200The Working Group was charged with the responsibility to
\insure that the regulatory process adequately considers health and environmen-
tal safety consequences of the products and processes of the new biotechnology
as they move from the research laboratory to the marketplace."201On the last
day of 1984, the Working Group published the Proposal for a Coordinated
Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology (the \Proposal").202The Working
Group concluded that the existing statutes and administrative agencies would
be adequate to regulate biotechnology if they were properly coordinated un-
der a single regulatory framework.203The proposed framework would interrelate
the regulations of FDA, EPA, USDA, NIH, the National Science Foundation
(NSF), and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), de-
pending upon the type of genetic research being reviewed, and was to consist of
a two-tiered system of oversight containing an interagency Coordinating Com-
mittee for Biotechnology which would oversee individual agency-based science
advisory boards.204The role of the Coordinating Committee would be to \fos-
200Homann, supra, note 146, at 518.
201Oce of Science and Technology Policy, Proposal for a Coordinated Framework for Reg-
ulation of Biotechnology, 49 Fed. Reg. 50,856, 50,856 (1984)
202Id.
20349 Fed. Reg. at 50,858. See also Gore, supra, note 161, at 23; Homann, supra, note
146, at 518.
20449 Fed. Reg. at 50,858. See Marc Miller & Gregory Aplet, Biological Control: A Little
Knowledge is a Dangerous Thing, 45 Rutgers L. Rev. 285, 324 (1993). See also Homann,
supra, note 146, at 518.
57ter timely and coordinated decision making via interagency communication on
matters of regulation; discuss matters of jurisdiction among agencies; serve as
a mechanism by which agencies can raise public and concerns; and consider
generic approaches for translating risk industry assessment information into
policy decisions...[as well as] monitor the changing scene of biotechnology, and
serve as a means of identifying potential gaps in regulation in a timely fashion,
making appropriate recommendations for either administrative or legislative
action."205The Working Group also prepared a detailed matrix that outlined
all laws, regulations and guidelines that the Working Group felt applicable to
biotechnology products regarding licensing, marketing and post-marketing, ex-
port, research, patents, and emissions, as well a listing of such requirements for
the various federal agencies themselves.206In addition, the Proposal contained
proposed administrative policy statements, prepared by FDA, EPA, and USDA,
that described the individual intra-agency regulatory frameworks within which
each administrative agency would regulate the aspects of biotechnology. The
FDA proposed policy statement, the FDA Statement of Policy for Regulating
Biotechnology Products, began by asserting that FDA possessed \extensive ex-
perience with the administrative and regulatory regimens described as applied
to the products of biotechnological processes, new and old."207In that policy
statement, FDA announced its intention to continue to regulate the products of
20549 Fed. Reg. at 50,858.
20649 Fed. Reg. at 50,857.
207FDA Statement of Policy for Regulating Biotechnology Products, 49 Fed. Reg. 50,878,
50,878 (1984).
58biotechnology on a case-by-case basis under its traditional regulatory scheme,
looking to the \intended-use" of individual products of biotechnology in deter-
mining into which regulatory category or categories|foods, drugs, devices, or
biologics|a product would be classied.208The policy statement then described
the regulatory requirements applicable to each product category.
The Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology was rst is-
sued in draft form to allow for a public comment period, and the Working Group
planned to issue nal draft documents early in 1986. During the comment pe-
riod, the Proposal and its statements of policy were meant to serve as interim
guidelines for the regulation of biotechnology. However, these interim guidelines
rapidly encountered signicant diculties in their ability to adequately control
the rst direct release experiments|which had in part inspired the creation of
the interim guidelines themselves.
As discussed briey above, in 1983, Agracetus, an agricultural producer, ap-
plied to RAC for approval to conduct controlled release experiments involving a
genetically-modied tobacco plant.209NIH approved this direct release, however
the approval was judicially enjoined by the \Ice-Minus" litigation.210To circum-
vent this judicially-created delay, Agracetus then submitted its application to
208Id.
209Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Natural Resources, Agriculture Research and Envi-
ronment and the Subcommittee on Science, Research and Technology of the House Committee
on Science and Technology, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 112, June 4, 5, No. 150, pg. 112-3 (1986)
(testimony of Hon. Harold Volkmer) (hereinafter the \Volkmer Statement"). See also William
Allen, The Current Federal Regulatory Framework for Release of Genetically-Altered Organ-
isms into the Environment, 42 Fla. L. Rev. 531, 547 (1990); Homann, supra, note 146, at
490.
210See infra.
59USDA instead. The application was routed by USDA internally to its Animal
Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), which decided that the genetically-
modied tobacco plant was not a \plant pest" as dened under the Federal
Plant Pest Act, therefore no impediment to USDA approval of the Agracetus
application existed. Agracetus then used this USDA approval (or perhaps, more
correctly, USDA non-action) to convince NIH to re-approve the direct release
experiments in 1985. Agracetus then conducted its eld tests in 1986. Shortly
after Agracetus re-applied to NIH, a second corporation, Calgene, applied to
USDA directly, without prior application to NIH, for approval of a direct re-
lease experiment involving a highly-similar genetically-modied tobacco plant;
USDA, instead of routing the Calgene application to APHIS or to NIH, assigned
review of the application to its Agricultural Recombinant DNA Research Com-
mittee (ARRC). This diering treatment of two similar applications highlighted
both the inter-agency and intra-agency inconsistencies that had evolved under
the NIH Guidelines system and demonstrated a stark lack of administrative co-
ordination under the interim framework.
Several months later, an even more serious controversy arose surrounding the
NIH approval of the direct release experiments involving \Ice-Minus" recom-
binant bacteria, discussed in detail above.211 While this approval had been
controversial almost from the outset, the full impact of the \Ice-Minus" inci-
dent was not felt until early 1986, when information became public that AGS,
in order to obtain supporting data for its application to EPA, had conducted
211See infra.
60unauthorized direct release experiments of \Ice-Minus" on unenclosed trees lo-
cated on the rooftop of its corporate oces in Oakland, California.212These
tests were conducted by AGS as part of its application to EPA in order to de-
termine whether \Ice-Minus" was pathogenic to fruit trees, however, the EPA
application stated that the pathogenicity experiments would be conducted un-
der controlled conditions.213When challenged by EPA, AGS asserted that a tree
was a \contained facility" as that term was dened by EPA, and therefore AGS
did not need EPA approval to conduct the test.214Shortly thereafter, a senate
subcommittee hearing discovered that one of the \remote test sites" proposed
by AGS for the \Ice-Minus" eld test was in fact merely the backyard of an
AGS employee, which was located in a residential neighborhood in Monterey
County, California.215EPA, in its review of the AGS application, had failed to
conrm the location of the test sites, and neither EPA nor AGS had disclosed the
planned experiments to the Board of Supervisors of Monterey County.216When
these facts became publicized, the Board of Supervisors of Monterey County
passed zoning ordinances banning the \Ice-Minus" experiment.217
One month after this hearing, a third direct release violation was discovered.
Techamerica Group, Inc., the inventor of a recombinant vaccine for inoculation
212Volkmer Statement, supra, note 166, at 114.
213Id.
214Id. See also Allen, note 166, at 548.
215Id.
216Id.
217Id.
61against pseudo-rabies in pigs had applied to USDA for approval of direct release
experiments to test the ecacy of this vaccine.218USDA approved the request
without routing the application to ARRC or to NIH, and USDA did not perform
an environmental assessment as required under NEPA.219The inventor then vi-
olated the NIH Guidelines by eld testing the vaccine in 1,400 total pigs in
multiple states without notifying or receiving the approval of the institution's
IBC.220Additionally, testimony before a senate subcommittee indicated that
USDA had failed to classify the vaccine as a \recombinant organism" until a
signicant portion of the eld studies had already been conducted; even after
this reclassication, the application was not submitted to ARRC or NIH.221As
with the defense set forth by AGS, when Techamerica Group was challenged by
USDA, it claimed that USDA approval was not required, alleging that the test-
ing of a vaccine on pigs did not constitute an \environmental release" and that
the vaccine did not constitute a \recombinant organism" because it contained
no foreign DNA.222
These controversies cast grave doubts upon the claims of the drafters of the
proposed coordinated framework that the existing administrative framework
could adequately regulate biotechnology. The nalized version of the Coordi-
nated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology was originally scheduled for
218Volkmer Statement, supra, note 166, at 115. See also Allen, note 166, at 549.
219Id.
220Id.
221Id.
222Id.
62publication in January of 1986, but was not issued until late June, and the
controversies plaguing the interim proposed framework had a signicant and
visible impact upon the overall structure of the nalized framework.223 The
nalized version of the Coordinated Framework dened as its overall structural
goal the ability to \provid[e] the opportunity for similar products to be treated
similarly by particular regulatory agencies."224 To achieve this level of coordina-
tion, however, the framework relied upon careful disassociation of the agencies,
rather than piecemeal harmonization, stating: \to the extent possible, respon-
sibility for a product use will lie with a single agency", and, \where regulatory
oversight or review for a particular product is to be performed by more than one
agency, the policy establishes a lead agency, and consolidated or coordinated re-
views."225 The framework then set forth a detailed jurisdictional division of the
regulation of the products of biotechnology between the administrative agen-
cies.226 This division relied in large part upon the basic product categories that
had existed at that time as dened by FDA, USDA, and EPA.227To balance this
22351 Fed.Reg. 23,302 (June 26, 1986). See Volkmer Statement, supra, note 166, at 116.
22451 Fed.Reg. at 23,302. The Coordinated Framework further stated its \two basic prin-
ciples" as \(1) Agencies should seek to adopt consistent denitions of those genetically en-
gineered organisms subject to review to the extent permitted by their respective statutory
authorities; and, (2) agencies should utilize scientic reviews of comparable rigor" (Id. at
23,303).
225Id. at 23,303.
226The Coordinated Framework summarized this division of jurisdiction as follows: \Foods,
food additives, human drugs, biologics and devices, and animal drug are reviewed or licensed
by the FDA. Food products prepared from domestic livestock and poultry are under the juris-
diction of the USDA's Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS). Animal biologics are reviewed
by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, (APHIS). APHIS also reviews plants,
seeds, animal biologics, plant pests, animal pathogens and `regulated articles', i.e., certain
genetically engineered organisms containing genetic material from a plant pest...Microbial
pesticides will be reviewed by EPA, with APHIS involvement in cases where the pesticide is
also a plant pest, animal pathogen, or regulated article requiring a permit." (Id. at 23,305).
227Id. at 23,304 (\The manufacture by the newer technologies of food, the development of
new drugs, medical devices, biologics for humans and animals, and pesticides, will be reviewed
by FDA, USDA and EPA in essentially the same manner for safety and ecacy as products
obtained by other techniques. The new products that will be brought to market will generally
63largely disassociated structure, the framework contemplated the involvement of
two coordinating groups. First, the Domestic Policy Council Working Group on
Biotechnology (the \Working Group") was to have a continued role in the nal-
ized framework, coordinating policy matters relating to jurisdictional disputes,
commercialization of products, and international harmonization.228Second, the
Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee (the \BSCC"), originally char-
tered on October 30, 1985, was intended to act within the nalized framework
as an expert scientic advisory committee to develop coordinated scientic poli-
cies and viewpoints and to aid in the evaluation of some applications.229While
an expert science advisory panel was a highly-commendable concept, the BSCC
in practice, however, was plagued with problems and controversies. In 1988,
the rst chairman of the BSCC was charged by the Department of Justice with
violating the Ethics in Government Act by failing to disclose conicts of interest
relating to the chairman's position as director of several corporate subsidiaries
of foreign biotechnology companies, and these allegations ultimately led to the
replacement of the BSCC chairman.230Also, several lawyers were appointed to
the BSCC, and the meetings of the BSCC were closed to the public, both of
which tainted its purported role as an impartial scientic advisory commit-
tee.231The BSCC was ultimately terminated amidst criticisms of domination
t within these agencies' review and approval regimens.").
228Maher, supra, note 174, at 139.
229Id.
230Id. at 140.
231Id.
64by medical and pharmaceutical interests.232In contrast to the prominent role
of NIH in the proposed framework, the nalized version of the Coordinated
Framework assigned a highly-diminished position to NIH in the overall regula-
tion of biotechnology. In commenting on this diminished role, the Coordinated
Framework stated that \[a]s research experiments have expanded out of the
biomedical area to environmental applications both agricultural and nonagri-
cultural, other agencies [besides NIH] have become involved, with shifting of
responsibility for research approval" to NSF, USDA, EPA, and FDA.233Each of
these administrative agencies also issued nalized versions of their policy state-
ments as attachments to the nalized Coordinated Framework. In its nalized
Statement of Policy for Regulating Biotechnology Products, FDA reiterated its
long-held position that \the agency need not establish new administrative pro-
cedures to deal with generic concerns about biotechnology.234FDA restated its
policy that the products of biotechnology would be reviewed on a case-by-case
basis and that full FDA review would be required for \most products manufac-
tured using new biotechnology" regardless of whether their non-biotechnological
232Id. at 141.
233Id. at 23,305 (\Approximately ten years ago the NIH issued the NIH guidelines describ-
ing the manner in which research with organisms derived by rDNA techniques should be
conducted. Since then the guidelines have been modied many times with gradual relaxation
of these requirements...As research experiments have expanded out of the biomedical area
to environmental applications both agricultural and nonagricultural, other agencies have be-
come involved, with shifting of responsibility for research approval to NSF (described in the
November 85 Notice), USDA's S & E, and EPA...Research on foods/food additives, human
drugs, medical devices and biologics will continue to rely on the NIH guidelines, with NIH
approval required for certain experiments such as human gene therapy, and FDA permission
for clinic trials."). See also Fogleman, supra, note 126, at 236.
23451 Fed.Reg. 23,309, 23,313 (June 26, 1986). See also Kin, supra, note 2, at 1580.
65analogs possessed FDA approval.235
Thus, the promulgation of the nalized Coordinated Framework for the Reg-
ulation of Biotechnology served to reassert the strong, centralized role of FDA
as the administrative agency with primary regulatory authority over many of
the products of biotechnology, and a signicant amount of the research related
thereto.
V. Reforms to FDA Regulation
The early 1980s mark a signicant turning point in the regulatory history of
FDA. Prior to the late 1970s, FDA lacked sucient regulatory authority to ad-
equately ensure the safety and ecacy of its various product categories. Nearly
all changes to FDA's administrative authority prior to the 1980s increased the
strength and breadth of FDA's jurisdiction over its regulated products. By the
end of the 1970s, Congress had expanded the administrative authority of FDA
suciently to allow FDA to create a stable structure of thorough pre-market
review and stringent post-market enforcement of the agency's regulatory poli-
cies. At the end of this period, FDA began to implement a modern system of
regulation that, though sometimes burdensome and time-consuming for prod-
235Id. at 23,309 (\The agency has re-examined this issue and continues to believe that, as
a general principle, new marketing applications will be required for most products manufac-
tured using new biotechnology...Because of potential dierences in the products resulting
from use of recombinant DNA technology, the resulting products may be new products re-
quiring separate approval under the applicable statutory provisions. However, each case will
be examined separately to determine the appropriate information to be submitted. In some
instances complete new applications may not be required.").
66uct manufacturers, resulted in a signicantly increased level of public safety and
condence in the consumer products regulated by FDA.
The late twentieth century, however, witnessed a dramatic increase in the
level of manufacturing capacity and the extent of scientic and technical knowl-
edge available to manufacturers. These changes served to dramatically decrease
both the time necessary for innovation and, as a consequence thereof, the pace
of product obsolescence. The resulting trend of ever-increasing concern by man-
ufacturers with delays in marketing products, and the communication of these
concerns to Congress, began to place enormous counter-pressure upon FDA to
speed the approval process for products. As a consequence of this counter-
pressure, many of the changes in FDA regulation implemented by FDA and
Congress during the nal two decades of the twentieth century consisted of re-
forms intended to speed and streamline the review process for new products.
This Part V discusses these two decades of reforms in detail. Subpart A discusses
reforms to FDA regulation prior to the adoption of the FDA Modernization Act
of 1997. For ease of organization, Subpart A rst discusses administrative re-
form initiatives during this period, and then discusses legislative initiatives for
reform, with the Prescription Drug User Fees Act of 1992 discussed in its own
separate section. Subpart B discusses the FDA Modernization Act of 1997 and
the reports and Congressional proposals that led to its adoption.
A. Reforms to FDA Regulation Prior to 1995.
1. Administrative Reforms
67In February of 1981, President Ronald Reagan issued Executive Order 12,291,
directing all federal administrative agencies to assess their existing regulatory
frameworks and to suggest potential reforms.236This Executive Order estab-
lished the President's Task Force on Regulatory Relief (the \Task Force"),
chaired by then Vice President George Bush, to oversee this process. The
Task Force identied the FDA drug approval process as one of the twenty
federal administrative programs most in need of regulatory reform.237Richard
S. Schweiker, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS), the administrative agency that oversees FDA, pledged in 1981 to make
substantial reforms to the FDA drug approval process, in light of the ndings
of the Task Force.238To implement this plegde, FDA quickly proposed two sets
of administrative reforms, the rst set modifying the NDA portion of the drug
approval process and the second modifying the IND portion, with additional
administrative reforms following shortly thereafter.
In 1982, FDA issued the rst of these proposed administrative reforms,
the FDA Proposed New Drug and Antibiotic Regulations (called the \NDA
Rewrite"), which proposed signicant reforms to the NDA process.239Some of
the reforms proposed to streamline the format for NDA applications in the NDA
23646 Fed.Reg. 13,193 (1981).
237See 47 Fed.Reg. 46,622, 46,622 (1982).
238Id.
23947 Fed.Reg. 46,622 (1982). FDA later issued proposed regulations to implement the NDA
Rewrite in 48 Fed.Reg. 26,720 (1983).
68Rewrite included allowing manufacturers to include data summaries, permitting
separate technical reviewers within FDA to review individual NDA applications
in parallel, authorizing the submission of clinical patient data in tables of essen-
tial data rather than requiring individual case reports for every patient, reducing
the number of supplemental lings required to support the initial NDA appli-
cations, expediting hearings to contest FDA disapprovals, and permitting the
acceptance of foreign data studies in support of NDAs.240Additionally, the NDA
Rewrite required an initial FDA response letter to new NDA applications within
180 days, stating whether the NDA was \approved", \approvable", or \not ap-
proved".241These proposed reforms were nalized in three years later.242In 1983,
FDA issued the FDA Proposed New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biologic Drug Prod-
uct Regulations, which proposed reforms to the IND portion of the drug approval
process (the \IND Rewrite").243The IND Rewrite signicantly streamlined the
IND process. These reforms included allowing manufacturers greater freedom
in the design and conduct of Phase I trials, clarifying IND application formats
and amendment procedures, creating a \clinical hold" procedure for halting
clinical research in situations where there was an unreasonable and signicant
risk to human subjects in order to balance the newfound Phase I freedoms,
and announcing relaxation of and exemption from much of the IND process for
24047 Fed.Reg. at 46,623.
24147 Fed.Reg. at 46,624.
24250 Fed.Reg. 7,452 (1985).
24348 Fed.Reg. 26,720 (1983).
69INDs submitted to support secondary uses of already-approved drugs.244The
IND Rewrite also formally proposed guidelines for \treatment INDs". Prior
to 1983, FDA had informally allowed individual physicians to sponsor and ob-
tain secondary INDs allowing the physicians to clinically administer to patients
certain unapproved new drugs undergoing the IND process if both the new
drug was intended for the treatment of an incurable or terminal disease and
promising data demonstrating the clinical safety and ecacy of the new drug
had been obtained in Phase I and II trials.245While the IND regulations then
in eect did not actually permit such secondary \treatment IND" trials, these
informal treatment IND trials allowed patients to access potentially life-saving
drugs approximately two to three years earlier than otherwise possible under
the standard FDA approval process.246FDA made clear in the IND Rewrite
that the formalized version of the treatment IND process \would be limited
to patients with serious diseases or conditions, for whom alternative therapies
do not exist or cannot be used."247Additionally, in dening the level of clini-
cal data necessary to support a treatment IND application, the IND Rewrite
stated that the process was intended \primarily for drugs that have completed
24448 Fed.Reg. at 26,721.
24548 Fed.Reg. at 26,728. See also Korwek, supra, note 50, at 136. The IND Rewrite
noted that, as of 1983, \treatment IND's submitted by individual physicians now account for
approximately 30 percent of all IND's received by FDA in a typical year." Id.
246Malinowski & O'Rourke, supra, note 1, at 625.
24748 Fed.Reg. at 26,721. See also Id. at 26,729: \FDA would only authorize use of a
drug under a treatment protocol/IND if it found: (1) That the proposed use is intended for a
serious disease condition in patients for whom no satisfactory approved drug or other therapy
is available; (2) that the potential benets of the drug's use outweigh the potential risks; and
(3) that there is sucient evidence of the drug's safety and eectiveness to justify its intended
treatment use."
70Phase II testing, when sucient evidence of safety and eectiveness has already
been obtained to justify making available an investigational drug for a treat-
ment use";248however, the IND Rewrite granted FDA administrative discretion
to allow treatment IND approval prior to the end of Phase II trials in some
cases, stating that \where compelling circumstances warrant, however, FDA
will consider permitting treatment use earlier in the IND process."249While the
treatment IND provisions of the IND Rewrite consisted in large part of formaliz-
ing the prior informal practices of FDA, the proposed treatment IND guidelines
did relax some of the principal informal requirements that FDA had imposed
upon this process. Prior to the IND Rewrite, FDA only allowed physicians|
not manufacturers|to sponsor treatment IND applications; the IND Rewrite
made clear that both physicians and manufacturers could request treatment
IND status, although physicians were required to obtain the consent of the drug
manufacturer in order to cross-reference the clinical data obtained by the man-
ufacturer under the original IND clinical trials.250The IND Rewrite also stated
that \[b]ecause toxicology, chemistry, and other technical information should
already be available for FDA review in the commercial sponsor's IND, in gen-
eral little or no additional supporting information would be required for either a
treatment protocol or a treatment IND." Additionally, the IND Rewrite noted
that the responsibilities of manufacturers and investigators in treatment IND
24848 Fed.Reg. at 26,721.
24948 Fed.Reg. at 26,729.
25048 Fed.Reg. at 26,723.
71trials would be generally identical to, and thus not in excess of, those require-
ments imposed upon other clinical trials, including IRB review, data recording,
and report submission requirements.251
The proposed IND Rewrite provisions were reproposed in March of 1987 and
nalized two months thereafter.252 The reproposed IND Rewrite explicitly
listed the AIDS epidemic as a motivation for the adoption of the IND re-
forms.253Additionally, the reproposed regulations allowed for the limited com-
mercial sale of a new drug during the treatment IND period, so long as FDA
did not object after a thirty day pre-notication period.254Under the NDA and
IND Rewrite procedures, FDA conducted a highly-expedited review of zidovu-
dine, the rst drug (later) approved by FDA to treat AIDS. In the zidovudine
approval process, the manufacturer and FDA constructed a focused and well-
designed Phase II trial that produced sucient evidence to support an extensive
treatment IND application. Appreciating the great need for the availability of
an AIDS treatment and possessing thorough, carefully-planned Phase II data,
FDA approved zidovudine for treatment of AIDS patients without Phase III tri-
als with the added requirement that the manufacturer agree to conduct Phase
IV (post-approval) research studying the eects of zidovudine in patients at an
earlier stage in the progression of the AIDS virus.255 This expedited approval
of zidovudine resulted in the drug reaching the market in two years, rather
25148 Fed.Reg. at 26,730.
252Reproposed 52 Fed.Reg. 8,850 (1987).
25352 Fed.Reg. 8,850, 8,850 (1987). See also Korwek, supra, note 50, at 137.
254Id.
25553 Fed.Reg. at 41,517
72than the six to eight years normally necessary for complete FDA review.256The
Task Force endorsed the nalized treatment IND procedures, and, in 1988, then
Vice President Bush, acting in his capacity as Chairman of the Task Force,
asked FDA to further develop procedures to allow highly-expedited review of
new products intended for the treatment of life-threatening diseases, with a
special focus on biomedical treatments for AIDS.257To comply with Vice Presi-
dent Bush's request, that same year, FDA issued the Investigational New Drug,
Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations; Procedures for Drugs In-
tended To Treat Life-Threatening and Severely Debilitating Illnesses (the \Ex-
pedited Review Regulations"), in which it proposed to build upon its success
with its review of zidovudine and formalize the expedited review process that it
had utilized.258The Expedited Review Regulations proposed to allow manufac-
turers of new drugs intended for the treatment of \life-threatening and severely
debilitating diseases", at the end of Phase I clinical trials, to reach an agree-
ment with FDA on the design of adequate Phase II trials intended to provide
sucient evidence of safety and eectiveness in order to allow NDA approval
without Phase III trials. If such an approval were granted, the Expedited Review
Regulations allowed FDA to condition approval of the NDA upon the manufac-
turer's agreement to conduct Phase IV trials to fully determine the risks and
optimal use of the new drug.259The Expedited Review Regulations dened the
256Id.
25753 Fed.Reg. at 41,516 (1988).
25853 Fed.Reg. 41,516 (1988). See also Korwek, supra, note 50, at 138.
25953 Fed.Reg. at 41,517.
73term life-threatening as \diseases where the likelihood of death is high unless the
course of the disease is interrupted (e.g., AIDS and cancer), as well as diseases
or conditions with potentially fatal outcomes where the end point of clinical
trial analysis is survival (e.g., increased survival in persons who have had a
stroke or heart attack)";260the Expedited Review Regulations dened the term
severely-debilitating diseases as \diseases or conditions that cause major irre-
versible morbidity (e.g., blindness or neurological degeneration)."261The IND
and NDA Rewrites and Expedited Review Regulations signicantly increased
the access of seriously-ill patients to clinical trial protocols involving new ther-
apies, however, many AIDS patients still could not gain access to the expedited
trials, because such trials were often fully enrolled or the excluded patients did
not meet the entry criteria, were too ill to participate, or were not living in an
area in which such trials were being conducted. In addition, because clinical
trials are required to possess a control group that does not actually receive the
new drug, seriously-ill patients were often concerned that, even though they
had gained access to the accelerated clinical trials, they might receive placebo
controls instead of the actual new drug under investigation. In recognition of
these inherent limitations in the accelerated access procedures, in 1990, FDA
issued the Expanded Availability of Investigational New Drugs Through a Par-
allel Track Mechanism for People With AIDS and HIV-Related Disease (the
\Parallel Track Regulations"), in which FDA proposed specialized expanded
26053 Fed.Reg. at 41,518.
261Id.
74treatment IND trials as a third mechanism for expediting the availability of
potential new AIDS therapies.262For promising new AIDS therapies that were
the subject of ongoing Phase I clinical trials, the Parallel Track Regulations
proposed allowing specialized additional studies of such new AIDS therapies
to be conducted in parallel to Phase I trials, however, these parallel studies
could be conducted without concurrent control groups for monitoring safety
and without clinical entry criteria, thus all participants in the parallel study
would be assured of receiving the new drug and not a placebo control.263In
the Parallel Track Regulations, FDA noted that these procedures would grant
patients access to unapproved drugs \at very early stages of product develop-
ment" when little safety data was available, which would expose \patients to
greater uncertainty and the risk of unforeseen and serious reactions."264Because
of this greatly increased risk, FDA stated that parallel track procedures would
only be made available to patients that possessed advanced symptoms of AIDS,
could not participate in the controlled accelerated trials, and could not take
standard treatments because they were contraindicated, could not be tolerated,
or were no longer eective.265Additionally, because of these greatly increased
26255 Fed.Reg. 20,856 (1990).
26355 Fed.Reg. at 20,856.
26455 Fed.Reg. at 20,856.
265The Parallel Track Regulations set forth the following test for patient qualication:
\The determinants of patient eligibility include all of the following:
1. The patient has clinically signicant HIV-related illness or is at imminent health risk
due to HIV-related immunodeciency.
2. The patient cannot participate in the controlled clinical trials because:
(a) The patient does not meet the entry criteria for the controlled clinical trials, or
(b) The patient is too ill to participate, or
(c) Participation in controlled clinical trials is likely to cause undue hardship (e.g. travel
time) as dened by the protocol.
75risks, FDA stated that the parallel track system would initially be maintained
as a \pilot process" and would only be available for therapies intended for the
treatment of AIDS.266The Parallel Track Regulations imposed a signicant set
of safeguards to protect against and minimize the risks of the system, such as
very limited product selection, informed consent for every patient, physician
and patient education programs, and requirements that each manufacturer es-
tablish a Data and Safety Monitoring Board for overseeing the parallel track
trial procedures.267Applications to conduct parallel track trials were to be sub-
mitted to FDA as amendments to existing IND applications. These parallel
track proposals would be referred by FDA to the AIDS Research Advisory
Committee (AIDS RAC) of NIH which would act as an advisor to FDA, unless
the manufacturer specically asked FDA to review the proposal itself.268The
Parallel Track Regulations set forth an eight factor test against which AIDS
RAC and FDA would consider parallel track proposal approvals, though FDA
stated that a \decision not to allow expanded availability of an investigational
drug would not imply a judgment about a drug's ultimate safety or ecacy nor
preclude additional controlled trials."269A nalized version of the Parallel Track
(d) The controlled clinical trials are fully enrolled.
3. The patient cannot take standard treatment (i.e. a drug approved for marketing or
available under a treatment IND for the same clinical condition for which the investigational
drug is being studied) because it is contraindicated, cannot be tolerated, or is no longer
eective."
55 Fed.Reg. at 20,858.
26655 Fed.Reg. at 20,856.
26755 Fed.Reg. at 20,858.
268Id.
269See 55 Fed.Reg. at 20,858.
76Regulations was issued in 1992.270On the same day that FDA issued its nal-
ized Parallel Track Regulations, FDA also issued the New Drug, Antibiotic,
and Biological Drug Product Regulations; Accelerated Approval (the \Surro-
gate Endpoint Regulations").271The Surrogate Endpoint Regulations proposed
to formalize the availability of expedited approvals of new drug applications
when clinical trials produced reliable evidence of the new drug's benecial eect
\on a surrogate endpoint that reasonably suggests clinical benet or evidence of
the drug's eect on a clinical endpoint other than survival or irreversible mor-
bidity", a practice which FDA had utilized informally for many years.272The
Surrogate Endpoint Regulations dened an acceptable surrogate endpoint as \a
laboratory measurement or physical sign that is used in therapeutic trials as a
substitute for a clinically meaningful endpoint that is a direct measure of how a
patient feels, functions, or survives and that is expected to predict the eect of
the therapy."273FDA also emphasized that, in gauging the risk of drug approval
based upon a particular surrogate endpoint, FDA would take into consideration
both the severity of the illness being treated and the extent of the benets of
the new drug over existing treatments.274Prior to the issuance of the Surrogate
27057 Fed.Reg. 13,250 (1992).
27157 Fed.Reg. 13,234 (1992).
272Id.
27357 Fed.Reg. at 13,235. FDA gave the following example of an acceptable surrogate
endpoint: \For example, substantially reducing elevated blood pressure has been repeatedly
shown to reduce the likelihood of stroke and renal failure. Reliance on a surrogate endpoint
is therefore a matter of scientic judgment, a judgment based on the available data, but still
a judgment." Id. at 13,235.
27457 Fed.Reg. at 13,236. In discussing its risk-benet calculus, FDA stated the following:
\Virtually all drugs can be toxic to humans, and no drug is completely free of risk. In
approving a new drug for marketing, FDA analyzes benets and risks, and approves a drug
77Endpoint Regulations, FDA had informally based several drug approvals upon
the favorable eect of a new drug on a surrogate endpoint, which allowed ap-
proval and marketing of drugs far before the drugs were demonstrated to eect a
patients survival or overall well-being, especially for drugs intended to treat dis-
eases that progress over a long period of time, such as AIDS.275However, FDA
noted that the use of surrogate endpoints signicantly increased the risk of un-
certainty and of unforeseen and serious reactions, and, as with the parallel track
procedures, FDA insisted on several additional safeguards in the Surrogate End-
point Regulations. First, FDA stated that the use of surrogate endpoints would
only apply to drugs meant to \provide meaningful therapeutic benet over ex-
isting treatment for patients with serious or life-threatening diseases."276FDA
also insisted both on formal reporting requirements and on additional special
reporting requirements upon the request of FDA.277As in the Expedited Review
Regulations, the Surrogate Endpoint Regulations insisted that manufacturers
could only receive NDA approval based upon surrogate endpoints if the man-
ufacturers agreed to conduct timely Phase IV research to fully assess the risks
if the benet outweighs the risks. In general, the more serious the illness and the greater the
eect of the drug on that illness, the greater the acceptable risk from the drug. If products
provide meaningful therapeutic benet over existing treatment for a serious or life-threatening
disease, a greater risk may also be acceptable." Id. at 13,236.
27557 Fed.Reg. at 13,235.
27657 Fed.Reg. at 13,234. FDA gave the following example to illustrate the requirement of a
benet over existing treatments: \For example, if there is an approved treatment for a serious
or life-threatening disease, individuals or a dened subset of patients may not respond well to
that therapy or be intolerant of it. A treatment shown to be eective in those patients would
be eligible for these procedures." Id. at 13234.
277Id.
78of the new drug.278FDA also required submission of all promotional labeling
and other materials disseminated for drugs approved based upon surrogate end-
points, fearing that such promotional materials could obscure or de-emphasize
the signicant risks involved with such accelerated approvals or promote in-
appropriate or unsafe uses of the products.279Finally, FDA retained the right
to restrict the distribution of new drugs approved based upon surrogate end-
points, including restrictions requiring distribution only to certain facilities or
only to physicians with special training or conditioning such distributions upon
the performance of additional medical procedures for each patient receiving the
new drug.280 FDA issued a nalized version of the Surrogate Endpoint Regula-
tions later that same year.281During this period of administrative reform, FDA
also signicantly altered its assignment of the internal review of and advising
on applications involving the products of biotechnology. First, prior to 1987,
the FDA Center for Drugs and Biologics possessed primary responsibility for
review of NDAs for both drugs and biologics, as well as enforcement of the post-
marketing provisions of the drug and biologic regulations. In 1987, in order to
allow the agency to focus additional resources upon new biologics therapies for
the treatment of AIDS, FDA split the Center for Drugs and Biologics into two
separate centers, the rst focusing purely on the regulation of drugs, the Center
for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), and the second focusing purely on
27857 Fed.Reg. at 13,236.
27957 Fed.Reg. at 13,237.
280Id.
28157 Fed.Reg. 58,943 (1992).
79the regulation of biologics and the administration of the FDA AIDS program,
the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER).282To better serve
the needs of biotehnology applicants, CBER was later reorganized into separate
divisions, including the Division of Cytokine Biology, the Division of Cellular
and Gene Therapies, and the Division of Monoclonal Antibodies.283Second, in
1990, FDA established the FDA Oce of Biotechnology, in order to \enable
FDA to meet the new challenges presented by advances in the area of biotech-
nology."284The Oce of Biotechnology was to be responsible for advising FDA
on scientic issues that would have an impact on biotechnology policy, direc-
tion, and long-term goals and was to serve as the focal point for management of
FDA activities relating to biotechnology research, training, contracts, and fel-
lowship.285The Oce of Biotechnology was to act as the representative of FDA
in Congressional, interagency, and public-relations matters relating to biotech-
nology.286In addition, the Oce of Biotechnology was to provide advice to all
centers of FDA concerning the latest methodology for the evaluation of the
safety and ecacy of the products of biotechnology.287After its creation, FDA
and the Oce of Biotechnology received positive feedback from the biotechnol-
ogy industry, which applauded FDA's increased focus upon and awareness of
28252 Fed.Reg. 38,275 (1987).
283Korwek, supra, note 50, at 145.
28455 Fed.Reg. 12,283 (1990).
285Id. See also Cuttler, supra, note 28, at 210.
286Id.
287See Cuttler, supra, note 28, at 210.
80advances in biotechnology.288
In 1991, FDA received its rst application for approval of a food derived from
genetically-altered plants, a tomato (called the Flavr-SavrTM tomato) modi-
ed by Calgene, Inc. to exhibit improved ripening and shelf-life. Under its
authority to regulate foods, FDA could assert jurisdiction over foods derived
from genetically-modied plants by considering such foods as adulterated or
mislabeled, and thereby subject to post-market seizure, or as containing unap-
proved new food additives, and thereby subject to pre-market approval require-
ments; however, the exact regulatory scheme that FDA would utilize for the
regulation of genetically-modied foods was unclear at the time of the Calgene
application. The following year, FDA's initial experience with this application
prompted FDA to announce a highly-liberalized system of regulation for foods
derived from genetically-modied plants in the FDA Statement of Policy: Foods
Derived from New Plant Varieties (the \1992 Statement of Policy").289 In the
1992 Statement of Policy, FDA began by reiterating its long-held position that
the properties of a food itself, rather than the method of production of the food,
were the determinative factors in FDA review of foods.290FDA then noted that
\[a]ny genetic modication technique has the potential to alter the composition
of food in a manner relevant to food safety, although, based on experience, the
likelihood of a safety hazard is typically very low."291The 1992 Statement of
288Id.
28957 Fed.Reg. 22,984 (1992).
29057 Fed.Reg. at 22,984-5 (\The method by which food is produced or developed may in
some cases help to understand the safety or nutritional characteristics of the nished food.
However, the key factors in reviewing safety concerns should be the characteristics of the food
product, rather than the fact that the new methods are used.").
29157 Fed.Reg. at 22,988.
81Policy announced that FDA would require pre-market review, under its food-
additives jurisdiction, of any genetically-modied food that possessed proteins
produced by recombinant genes if such proteins either diered substantially in
structure or function from the proteins generally found in foods or resulted in
any substance that occurred unexpectedly or at a level that may be injurious
to health.292Foods containing only recombinant proteins that are substantially
similar to proteins found naturally in foods would be considered generally recog-
nized as safe, and such foods would only be subject to the general requirements
for all foods.293The 1992 Statement of Policy conditioned this relaxed regu-
lation of \substantially similar" recombinant foods by stating that FDA will
carefully review all foods that possess proteins derived from recombinant mate-
rial from commonly allergenic foods, such as milk, eggs, wheat, sh, tree nuts,
and legumes, and FDA would require either that manufacturers of such foods
demonstrate that no allergenic substances were present in the recombinant food
or that the recombinant food contained adequate labeling to alert consumers to
the potential risk of allergy.294In a startling display of the speed of advances in
29257 Fed.Reg. at 22,990.
29357 Fed.Reg. at 29,990 (\Nucleic acids [the building blocks of proteins] are present in the
cells of every living organism, including every plant and animal used for food by humans or
animals, and do not raise a safety concern as a component of food. In regulatory terms, such
material is presumed to be GRAS...[and]...When the substance present in the food is one
that is already present at generally comparable or greater levels in currently consumed foods,
there is unlikely to be a safety question sucient to call into question the presumed GRAS
status of such naturally occurring substances and thus warrant formal premarket review and
approval by FDA. Likewise, minor variations in molecular structure that do not aect safety
would not ordinarily aect the GRAS status of the substances"). See also J. H. Maryanski,
FDA's Policy for Foods Developed by Biotechnology, Center for Food Safety and Applied
Nutrition Handout: 1995, American Chemical Society Symposium Series No. 605 (1995)
(Available on-line).
29457 Fed.Reg. at 22,9991. See also Maryanski, supra, note 269.
82biotechnology, one year after the FDA issued its policy on the regulation of prod-
ucts derived from genetically-modied foods, FDA was confronted with the need
to announce its policy on the regulation of products derived from genetically-
modied people. In 1990, a four-year old girl born with Sever Combined Immune
Deciency, a rare disorder which results in immune system failure, was cured by
the introduction of new recombinant genes.295These recombinant genes contin-
ued to maintain a functional immune response four years later, when the scien-
tists involved declared the gene therapy experiment a resounding success.296By
1993, over 100 human gene therapy procedures had been approved worldwide,
and some of these manufacturers and researchers requested FDA to clarify its
policies for the regulation of gene therapy trials.297To respond to this request,
in 1993, FDA issued the FDA Application of Current Statutory Authorities
to Human Somatic Cell Therapy Products and Gene Therapy Products (the
\Gene Therapy Policy").298In the Gene Therapy Policy, FDA divided products
intended for genetic manipulation into two separate categories: \somatic cell
therapy products" and \gene therapy products".299The Gene Therapy Policy
295Ralph Oman, Biotech Patenting Issues Raise Ethical Concerns, Nat'l L.J., May 8, 1995,
at C42. See also Malinowski & Maureen A. O'Rourke, supra, note 1, at 174.
296Dolores Kong, Study: First Gene Therapy a Success, Boston Globe, Oct. 20, 1995, at 3.
See also Malinowski & O'Rourke, supra, note 1, at 174-5.
297Malinowski & O'Rourke, supra, note 1, at 175. See also 58 Fed.Reg. 53,248, 53,248 (1993).
Other genetic disorders include cystic brosis (1 in 2,500 white births), down syndrome (1
in 1,000 births), muscular dystrophy (1 in 3,300 male births), fragile X syndrome (1 in 1,500
male births), hemophilia A (1 in 8,500 male births), Huntington's disease (1 in 25,000 births),
polycystic kidney disease (1 in 3,000 births), sickle-cell anemia (1 in 600 black births), and
Tay-Sachs disease (1 in 3,600 Jewish births). From Frederic Golden, Good Eggs, Bad Eggs,
Time, January 11, 1999.
29858 Fed.Reg. 53,248 (1993).
299Id.
83dened \somatic cell therapy products" as \autologous (i.e., self), allogeneic
(i.e., intra-species), or xenogeneic (i.e., inter-species) cells that have been prop-
agated, expanded, selected, pharmacologically treated, or otherwise altered in
biological characteristics ex vivo to be administered to humans and applicable
to the prevention, treatment, cure, diagnosis, or mitigation of disease or in-
juries."300Because somatic cell therapy procedures involved the introduction of
genetically-modied whole cells into humans, FDA maintained that such prod-
ucts constituted both a drug and a biologic, and, as such, would be required to
complete the IND and NDA process and comply with any CGMP guidelines in
addition to satisfying the ELA and PLA licensure requirements.301\Gene ther-
apy products", by contrast, were dened as \products containing genetic mate-
rial administered to modify or manipulate the expression of genetic material or
to alter the biological properties of living cells."302FDA stated that gene ther-
apy products contained in viral vectors constituted both a biologic and a drug,
whereas such products contained in a chemically-synthesized vector system met
only the denition of a drug.303In 1995, to address complaints that products
of gene therapy were subject to double regulation, the NIH Guidelines were
amended to create a consolidated procedure for NIH and FDA review of gene
therapy trials.304Additionally, following the release of the Gene Therapy Policy,
30058 Fed.Reg. at 53,249.
301Id.
302Id.
303Id.
30460 Fed.Reg. 20,726 (1995).
84CBER proposed in 1994, and Congress mandated in 1995, that FDA develop
a gene therapy patient data registry under FDA's Computerized Submission
Management and Review Tracking System program.305Early gene therapy tri-
als did not have the impact desired by scientists. Most early gene therapy trials
failed in the Phase I portion of research, as many recombinant genes inserted
into humans either did not functionally express proteins or achieved functional
expression for a short time and then inexplicably ceased to function.306An early
gene therapy trial for cystic brosis utilized an adenoviral vector that resulted in
such severe inammation that FDA ordered the termination of the clinical trial,
and this failure served to greatly increase public concern over the safety of gene
therapy.307Over thirty states eventually passed laws banning gene therapy and
limited or prohibited the ability of health care insurers to discriminate against
persons with genetic disorders.308One of the few gene therapy procedures actu-
ally reaching Phase III trials involved the treatment of brain cancer by utilizing
a virus that only infects dividing cells in order to facilitate the introduction into
brain cells of a recombinant gene derived from the herpes virus.309The inser-
tion of this gene made all genetically-modied brain cells highly sensitive to a
standard herpes treatment (ganciclovir), and, because only cancerous brain cells
undergo cell division, the gene was selectively introduced only into cancerous
305Noguchi, supra, note 47, at 370.
306Leon Jaro, Fixing the Genes, Time, January 11, 1999.
307Id.
308Christopher Hallowell, Playing the Odds, Time, January 11, 1999.
309Jaro, supra, 280.
85cells, which died upon treatment with ganciclovir.310
2. Legislative Reforms
Orphan In addition to these administrative reforms for accelerating
approval, beginning in Drug Act
of 1983, 1983, Congress adopted two sets of legislative reforms designed
to alleviate signicant disincentives created by the burdens of the FDA approval
process. Conducting clinical trials sucient to support an adequate NDA was
extremely expensive, and Congress and FDA quickly realized this expense cre-
ated a large disincentive for manufacturers to promote drugs intended for the
treatment of rare diseases. FDA initially attempted to address this disincen-
tive by allowing many such drugs, called \orphan drugs", to remain indenitely
covered by an approved IND while allowing the manufacturers to administer
the orphan drugs to patients in quasi-clinical trials.311 However, this adminis-
trative solution ultimately proved unsatisfactory, and, to remedy this situation,
Congress passed the Orphan Drug Act of 1983.312The Orphan Drug Act pro-
vided that the manufacturer of a drug designated as an \orphan drug" by FDA
was entitled to a fty percent tax credit for the cost of conducting clinical tri-
als, could request federal funding to assist in the conduct of the clinical trials,
and, if FDA ultimately approves the manufacturer's NDA application, was en-
titled to market exclusivity for seven years.313 \Orphan drug" status could be
310Id.
311Hutt & Merrill, supra, note 2, at 566.
312Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2,049, codied as amended at 21 U.S.C. || 360aa et seq.
(Jan. 4, 1983). FDA published implementing guidelines in 48 Fed.Reg. 40,784 (1983).
313See Malinowski & O'Rourke, supra, note 1, at 202. See also Hutt & Merrill, supra, note
86conferred by FDA on any drug that was intended primarily to treat a \rare
disease or condition".314 Shortly after the adoption of the Orphan Drug Act,
Congress amended the denition of \rare disease or condition" to include any
disease or condition that aects less than 200,000 people.315 Additionally, in
the IND Rewrite, FDA identied orphan drugs as \leading candidates" for the
treatment IND process.316 While the Orphan Drug Act did serve its purpose
and incentivise the treatment of rare diseases, the Act also resulted in a sub-
stantial amount of litigation regarding the extent of \similarity" necessary to
trigger the protections of the seven year exclusivity period.317
One year after the adoption of the Orphan Drug Act, Congress again at-
tempted to remedy two additional disincentives created by the FDA regulatory
structure. Manufacturers of novel drugs and devices often obtain patent pro-
tection for their inventions, the term of which at that time lasted seventeen
years from the date of issuance of the patent.318 Because of the great expense
involved in obtaining FDA approval, most manufacturers refused to commence
clinical trials before they were assured of the availability of patent protection
for their inventions, which would guarantee market exclusivity and allow the
manufacturer to recoup its investment. Full FDA review of products, however,
often required six or more years to reach completion.319This essentially resulted
2, at 566.
31421 U.S.C. .
315Health Promotion and Disease Prevention Amendments of 1984, 98 Stat. 2815 (1984).
31648 Fed.Reg. 26,720, 26,721 (1983).
317Korwek, supra, note 50, at 148-9. See e.g. Genentech v. Bowen, 676 F.Supp. 301
(D.C.D.C. 1987), Hutt & Merrill, supra, note 2, at 567.
31835 U.S.C.A. |154.
319See Merrill, supra, note 17, at 1,792.
87in a forfeiture by manufacturers of a signicant portion of their seventeen year
patent term while involved in the FDA review process. The eect of this for-
feiture on manufacturers of pioneer drugs was mitigated, however, by the FDA
treatment of generic (\me-too") drugs. After the adoption of the Drug Amend-
ments of 1962, FDA instituted the requirement that all generic drugs be the
subject of their own approved NDA prior to marketing. However, FDA had
long maintained the position that the clinical data submitted in the pioneer
NDA application was condential and constituted trade secrets of the pioneer
manufacturer.320 Because generics manufacturers could not initiate clinical tri-
als prior to expiration of the pioneer drug patent and then could not incorporate
by reference the condential safety and ecacy data that had supported the pi-
oneer NDA, generics manufacturers were forced either to undergo the full FDA
approval process, thus extending the period of market exclusivity of the pioneer
drug (this additional exclusivity is often referred to as a \second patent"), or to
purchase permission from the pioneer manufacturer to utilize the pioneer clini-
cal data in the generic drug NDA, thereby allowing the manufacturer to extract
license fees and royalty payments.321
Drug Price To attempt to reverse both of these disincentives to man-
ufacturers, Congress Competition
and Patent adopted the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restora-
tion Act of 1984 (the Term
Restoration \1984 Act").322 The 1984 Act essentially embodied a com-
320See Merrill, supra, note 17, at 1,792.
321FDA's position that all clinical data constituted condential information not discover-
able under the Freedom of Information Act was upheld in court. Tri-Bio Laboratories v.
Unites States, 836 F.2d 135 (3rd Cir. 1987); Public Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA,
704 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1983). See Merrill, supra, note 17, at 1,793.
322Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1,585 (Sept. 24, 1984) (the \1984 Act").
88promise struck between Act of 1984
manufacturers of pioneer and generic products. To remedy the loss of pi-
oneer manufacturer's patent life, the 1984 Act allowed pioneer manufacturers
to extend the life of their patent by adding half of the time spent in the IND
process and all of the time during which an NDA application was reviewed
by FDA, up to a combined maximum of fourteen years.323 In compromise for
this extended patent protection, the 1984 Act allowed manufacturers of generic
products to rely upon the clinical data submitted to support approval of the pi-
oneer NDA.324This compromise successfully realigned the incentives of pioneer
and generic drug manufacturers.
The same sense of urgency for new treatments eective against AIDS, cancer,
and other incurable diseases that had prompted Congressional and administra-
tive actions loosening the regulation of drugs in the 1980s animated a set of
reforms strengthening the regulation of medical devices. In the mid 1980s, sev-
eral reports of the General Accounting Oce (GAO), the Oce of Technical
Assessment (OTA), and the Oce of Inspector General of HHS (OIG), each
of which had conducted investigations of FDA regulation of devices, concluded
that the authority granted to FDA under the Device Amendments of 1976 was
inadequate in its ability to allow FDA to compel disclosure of device related
problems by device user facilities (hospitals, nursing homes, ambulatory sur-
gical facilities, and outpatient treatment facilities) or allow FDA to follow up
3231984 Act || 201(c), (g), 98 Stat. 1,619, codied at 35 U.S.C. |156. See also Korwek,
supra, note 50, at 137.
3241984 Act | 104, 98 Stat. 1,610.
89on any such disclosures once made.325A 1986 report from a GAO study stated
that more than ninety-nine percent of device-related problems occurring in hos-
pitals were not reported to FDA.326Other reports found that many hospitals
were actually unaware of their reporting obligations to FDA regarding device
failures.
Safe To remedy this under-reporting by device user facilities, in
1990, Congress Medical
Devices adopted the Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990 (the \1990 Act").327
The 1990 Act made Act of 1990
numerous alterations to the provisions of the 1976 Amendments.328 The
1990 Act required that device user facilities, or in some cases the medical de-
vice manufacturer, report to FDA any deaths, serious illnesses, injuries, adverse
eects, or deciencies related to medical devices used by patients or employ-
ees of the facility within 10 days after such occurrence, as well as requiring
that facilities le a semiannual report to FDA summarizing all such interim
reports led with FDA or manufacturers.329The 1990 Act also required man-
ufacturers of medical devices that possessed potentially serious adverse health
risks or that were either life-sustaining or permanently-implantable to develop
and maintain a system for tracking and, if necessary, recalling such medical de-
32556 Fed.Reg. 60,024, 60,025 (1991). See also Theodosia Tamborlane, The FDA Moves to
Implement the Safe Medical Devices Act, 9 NO. 10 HealthSpan 7, 7 (1992).
326Id.
327Pub. L. No. 101-629, 104 Stat. 4,511, codied in various provisions of 21 U.S.C. | 360a
et seq. (Nov. 28, 1990).
328See Hutt & Merrill, supra, note 2, at 746, 750.
329Safe Medical Devices Act |519(b)(1). See 56 Fed.Reg. at 60,025. See also Charles J.
Raubicheck, The FDA's Implementation of the Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, 46 Food
Drug Cosm. L.J. 885, 885.
90vices.330Such devices must also be the subject of a plan of post-market surveil-
lance that is pre-approved by FDA after clearance by an FDA advisory com-
mittee.331To enforce the ndings of post-market surveillance and reporting re-
quirements, the 1990 Act granted FDA the authority to recall any device that
posed a reasonable probability of causing serious adverse health consequences
or death.332Additionally, the 1990 Act charged FDA with providing education
and information to facilities that possessed reporting responsibilities under the
1990 Act reporting provisions.333
While these legislative changes strengthened the enforcement powers of FDA,
the 1990 Act also relaxed some of the requirements of FDA approval of med-
ical devices. The 1990 Act claried the treatment of predicate (\piggyback")
devices by making explicit FDA's informal practice of allowing new devices to
claim substantial equivalence to a prior-approved predicate device, and thereby
avoid Class III status and pre-market approval requirements, if the new device
has the same intended use as the predicate device and either has the same tech-
nological characteristics or has data demonstrating that the new device is at
least as safe and eective as the predicate device.334 Further, the 1990 Act es-
tablished a \Humanitarian Device Exemption", similar to the Orphan Drug Act
exemption, under which any device intended to treat a disease aecting less than
33021 U.S.C. | 360i(e). Raubicheck, supra, note 276, at 886.
33121 U.S.C. | 360k. Raubicheck, supra, note 276, at 887.
33221 U.S.C. |360h(e). Raubicheck, supra, note 276, at 889.
333Safe Medical Devices Act |2(d). See 56 Fed.Reg. at 60,025.
334Safe Medical Device Act |513(i). See Hutt & Merrill, supra, note 2, at 756. See also
Raubicheck, supra, note 276, at 889.
91four-thousand people would be exempted from PMA and Class II requirements,
subject to certain commercial sale restrictions.335
3. The Prescription Drug User Fees Act of 1992
Prescription Although FDA had made signicant reforms to its reg-
ulations of drugs, by early Drug User
Fees Act in the 1990s, manufacturers and patients were still complaining
that new drug review of 1992
times were unacceptably long. FDA, in response, noted that the major im-
pediment to faster new drug approval rates was the lack of a sucient number
of qualied sta to handle the ever-increasing number of applications. To ad-
dress this impediment, Congress adopted the Prescription Drug User Fee Act
of 1992 (\PDUFA"), which authorized FDA to collect user fees from drug man-
ufacturers.336 The concept of FDA user fees was not novel when proposed
in 1992. GAO had recommended to Congress that FDA collect user fees for
NDA application review in 1971, and the President's Private Sector Survey on
Cost Control echoed this recommendation in 1983.337 Almost every year fol-
lowing the release of this report, the President's budget proposal has included
a recommendation for FDA user fees to substitute for budget revenues; how-
ever, FDA had steadfastly opposed such fees, and Congress supported FDA by
deleting the user fees from the budget.338 Congress was concerned that the as-
sessment of uniform user fees would unfairly disadvantage small businesses and
orphan drug producers, however, politically there was no alternative solution
33521 U.S.C. s 360j(m). See Raubicheck, supra, note 276, at 889.
336Pub. L. No. 102-335, 106 Stat. 941 (Aug. 26, 1992).
337Government Accounting Oce, Fees Not Charged for Processing Applications for New
Drugs (1971); President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, Task Force Report on User
Charges 271-74 (1983). See also Bruce N. Kuhlik, Industry Funding of Improvements in the
FDA's New Drug approval Process: the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, 47 Food &
Drug L. J. 483, 487 (1992).
338Kuhlik, supra, note 291, at 487.
92to allocate adequate additional funding to FDA.339 PDUFA represented a com-
promise between all of these concerns. PDUFA authorized FDA to collect user
fees, in amounts increasing each year, for NDA applications and amendments,
annual fees collected for each manufacturing establishment that produces pre-
scription drugs, and annual fees collected for each prescription product approved
for marketing.340These fees, however, were signicantly reduced, deferred, or
waived entirely for businesses employing less than ve-hundred employees.341
The collection of these fees allowed FDA to hire an additional 620 reviewers.342
These additional reviewers, in turn, allowed FDA to create a special new class
of applications that would receive preferential, and thereby expedited, review;
these expedited applications were referred to as \priority" or \Type P" appli-
cations.343
In exchange for the authority to collect user fees, Congress required FDA to
propose an aggressive set of improved-performance milestones for CDER and
CBER. Because FDA would require a signicant period of time in which to hire
and train its new reviewers, these milestones were composed with increasing
requirements set for each year until the full set of improvements was to be in
place in 1997.344To ensure FDA compliance with these milestones, Congress
only authorized PDUFA for ve years, and thus the user fee authority would
339Mary Beth Bierut, The Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992: Speeding Up the Drug
Approval Process, 9 No. 11 HealthSpan 13, 15 (December 1992).
340 . See Bierut, supra, note 293, at 13.
341 . See Bierut, supra, note 293, at 13.
342Malinowski & O'Rourke, supra, note 1, at 210.
343Id.
344See Robert Temple, M.D., Commentary on \The Architecture of Government Regulation
of Medical Products", 82 Va. L. Rev. 1877, 1881 (1996).
93need to be authorized again by Congress in 1997. These improvement mile-
stones were not contained in PDUFA itself, however, but were proposed in
two letters written by FDA Commissioner David A. Kessler, M.D., one month
prior to the eventual adoption of PDUFA and sent to Chairman John Din-
gell and Ranking Minority Member Norman Lent of the House Committee on
Energy and Commerce and Chairman Edward M. Kennedy and Ranking Mi-
nority Member Orrin G. Hatch of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human
Resources. The goals set forth by Commissioner Kessler were ambitious: to
review and act on \priority" applications and \priority" amendments within six
months after submission, \standard" applications within twelve months after
submission, \standard" amendments within six months after submission if no
review of clinical data was required or within twelve months after submission if
clinical data must have been reviewed to support approval of the amendment,
and complete applications resubmitted following issuance of a non-approval let-
ter within six months after submission.345 In this context, to \act on" was
\understood to mean the issuance of an action letter after the ling of an ap-
plication...[that], if it is not an approval, or approvable letter, will set forth
in detail the specic deciencies and, where appropriate, the actions necessary
345Letter from David A. Kessler, M.D., Commissioner of Food and Drugs, to Rep. John
D. Dingell and Rep. Norman Lent (Sept. 14, 1992); Letter from David A. Kessler, M.D.,
Commissioner of Food and Drugs, to Senator Edward M. Kennedy and Senator Orrin G.
Hatch (Sept. 14, 1992) (hereinafter collectively the Kessler September 14 letter); Letter from
David A. Kessler, M.D., Commissioner of Food and Drugs, to Rep. John D. Dingell and
Rep. Norman Lent (Sept. 22, 1992); Letter from David A. Kessler, M.D., Commissioner of
Food and Drugs, to Senator Edward M. Kennedy and Senator Orrin G. Hatch (Sept. 22,
1992) (hereinafter collectively the Kessler September 22 Letter). Reprints of these letters are
contained in 138 Cong. Rec. H9099, H9099-9100 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1992). For a thorough
review of these letters and their impact on Congressional legislation, see Kuhlik, supra, note
291, at 488-491.
94to place the application in condition for approval."346 Commissioner Kessler
further proposed that FDA would review and act on all backlogged NDA, PLA,
and ELA applications within twenty-four months after initiation of the user fee
payment system.347Commissioner Kessler also set interim application goals, un-
der which FDA would review an increasing percentage of each succeeding new
year's submitted applications and amendments within the specied milestone
periods, beginning with fty-ve percent in 1994 and increasing to ninety per-
cent in 1997.348 To gain the support of non-prescription drug manufacturers
for PDUFA, Commissioner Kessler's second letter made some of these improved
review times applicable to non-prescription drug applications and amendments
as well.349
While FDA was in the initial stages of implementing the user fee system and
improved performance goals for drugs, the House Committee on Oversight and
Investigations, also Chaired by Rep. John Dingell, released a highly critical
report of the FDA implementation of its device regulation program under the
1990 Act, entitled \Less Than the Sum of Its Parts".350 FDA relied upon this
report to recommend an extension of the user fees program to medical device
applications, however, when legislation was proposed to implement this rec-
ommendation, it faced signicant industry opposition and was therefore never
adopted.351
346Kessler September 14 Letter, 138 Cong. Rec. at H9099.
347Id.
348Id.
349Kessler September 22 Letter, 138 Cong. Rec. at H9099-9100.
350H.R. REP. NO. 103-N, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1993).
351 .
95The use of user fees in the regulation of drugs signicantly decreased the time
required for product approvals by FDA. Prior to the adoption of PDUFA, FDA
had been criticized upon comparison to drug review in France and England,
both of which approved drugs signicantly faster than FDA on a consistent
basis. Between 1992 and 1996, six antiviral therapies developed for the treat-
ment of AIDS were developed, and, with the added resources supplied by user
fees, FDA reviewed and approved ve of these six therapies faster than ei-
ther France or England, with the sixth therapy approved simultaneously by
all three agencies.352In approvals outside the AIDS context, FDA consistently
compared well to these foreign drug approval agencies, and FDA was the rst
to approve new products whose intended uses spanned a wide range diseases,
such as cancer, leukemia, cystic brosis, multiple sclerosis, Lou Gehrig's disease,
and Alzheimer's disease.353 While the adoption of PDUFA and the collection
of user fees by FDA substantially decreased the time required for product ap-
provals, FDA quickly realized that administrative reliance upon user fees became
golden handcus, and, in 1997, when PDUFA would require reauthorization by
Congress, industry representatives could exert signicant leverage against FDA
by lobbying Congress to tie further regulatory reforms to the reauthorization of
PDUFA.
B. The FDA Modernization Act of 1997
352David A. Kessler, M.D., Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration, Statement Before
the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, United States Senate, February 21, 1996
(available on-line www.fda.gov).
353Id.
96In 1993, President Clinton created the National Performance Review (NPR),
later renamed the National Partnership for Reinventing Government, which was
headed by Vice President Gore. The stated \mission" of the NPR was to review
and propose reforms to all administrative agencies in order \to create a govern-
ment that works better, costs less, and gets results Americans care about."354
The NPR identied FDA as one of thirty-two \High Impact Agencies", which
were selected \based on their high degree of interaction with the public, busi-
ness, or the operation of other federal agencies."355In 1995, Vice President Gore
requested the directors of each of these High Impact Agencies to propose \a
small handful of signicant, concrete, measurable goals that c[ould] be achieved
over the next three years."356
In response to this request, FDA proposed two separate sets of adminis-
trative reforms, many of which consisted of extensions of existing FDA reform
initiatives. In April of 1995, the rst set of these reforms were published in
an NPR report co-authored by President Clinton and Vice President Gore en-
titled Reinventing Drug & Medical Device Regulations (\Reinventing America
I").357As discussed earlier, FDA had traditionally required that companies con-
struct full-scale working manufacturing plants prior to receiving ELA and PLA
354John Kamensky, National Partnership for Reinventing Government: A Brief History,
January 1999 (available on-line at www.npr.gov).
355National Partnership for Reinventing Government, \High Impact Agencies: A Background
Paper", September 1998 (available on-line at www.npr.gov).
356Kaensky, supra, note 350.
357President Bill Clinton & Vice President Al Gore, Report of the National Performance
Review: Reinventing Drug & Medical Device Regulations, April 1995 (\Reinventing America
I").
97license approvals, thereby requiring these companies to make large up-front in-
vestments in facilities for unapproved drugs and biologicals that might never
reach market. Further, FDA had also required that, once such licensing ap-
proval was granted, companies receive prior FDA approval before instituting
any signicant changes to licensed manufacturing facilities or processes. In the
Reinventing America I report, FDA stated that it would allow companies to
receive ELA and PLA approvals for pilot and small-scale manufacturing facili-
ties and would eliminate many of the requirements for pre-approval of changes
to manufacturing plants and facilities.358 For biologicals not concurrently reg-
ulated as drugs, FDA proposed a three-tiered categorization of changes to bi-
ological manufacturing plants and facilities: Category I changes would include
mere relocations of equipment, tightening of existing specications, and changes
in the supplier of components and would require no supplemental reports to
FDA; Category II changes, including expansions of manufacturing support sys-
tems, modications to manufacturing areas, and replacement of old equipment
with equipment of similar but not identical design, would require submission
of a standard reporting supplement to FDA and a thirty-day waiting period in
which FDA could challenge the modications; and Category III changes, includ-
ing alterations in processing conditions, dosage forms, and dating periods, would
continue to require prior approval by FDA.359 Also in the Reinventing America
I report, FDA, in a formalization of its practices under the Expedited Review
358Reinventing America I, supra, note 354, at 4-10.
359Id. at 8. See also Food and Drug Administration, Changes to an Approved Application
for Specied Biotechnology and Specied Synthetic Biological Products, 62 Fed.Reg. 39,904
(July 24, 1997).
98procedures, announced that in limited cases it would no longer require multiple
clinical trials to support an NDA application if one adequately-designed multi-
center clinical trial could be constructed, citing the zidovudine approval as an
example of such practices.360 To assist in the structuring of such clinical trials,
FDA issued a revised statement of policy clarifying the requirements utilized by
FDA in determining safety and eectiveness.361
In the Reinventing America I report, FDA further proposed several changes
to medical device regulation. First, FDA announced its intention to exempt
from pre-market review nearly 125 additional categories of low-risk medical de-
vices.362 FDA also nally acquiesced to the long-standing industry proposal for
the creation of a pilot program for the limited external review by private FDA-
accredited institutions of certain 510(k) \substantial equivalence" applications
for several categories of low risk medical devices, modeled after a similar system
of private-sector review utilized in the European Community.363 This private
institutional review of medical devices was to be supported by user fees, and
FDA further reiterated its proposal from two years earlier for the authorization
of medical device user fees for all FDA administrative activities.364
Seven months after the publication of the Reinventing America I report, the
360Id. at 28-29. The zidovudine clinical trial is discussed infra.
361Food and Drug Administration, Guidance for Industry: Providing Clinical Evidence of
Eectiveness for Human Drug and biological Products, 63 Fed.Reg. 27,093 (May 15, 1998),
proposed at 62 Fed.Reg. 13,650 (March 21, 1997).
362Id. at 5.
363Id. at 20. See also Pilot & Waldmann, supra, note 91.
364Id. at 20-22. Such general device user fees had been predicted to raise over $23 million
in revenues for FDA if implemented. Id.
99second set of reforms proposed by FDA was published in a second NPR report
entitled Reinventing the Regulation of Drugs Made from Biotechnology (\Rein-
venting America II").365The goal of this second set of reforms was to harmonize
the regulation by CBER (biologics) and CDER (drugs) of \well-characterized"
biotechnological drug products, which both of these FDA centers had regu-
lated on a case-by-case basis as either drugs, biologics, or both.366To this end,
for such \well-characterized" biotechnology products, FDA announced that it
would eliminate the requirement of separate ELA and PLA license applications
for biotech manufacturing facilities, essentially formalizing its then current ad-
ministrative practice of allowing relaxed inspections to support ELA approvals
for facilities producing \well-characterized" biological drugs, and FDA further
proposed to cease requiring individual lot samples for every batch of \well-
characterized" biotechnology drug products.367 The ELA application require-
ment was replaced by a system of more thorough post-marketing inspections by
CBER to ensure CGMP compliance, and the PLA application was modied to
be harmonized with a new NDA application format that incorporated some of
the information formerly contained in the ELA applications.368 The elimina-
365President Bill Clinton & Vice President Al Gore, Report of the National Performance Re-
view: Reinventing the Regulation of Drugs Made from Biotechnology, November 1995 (avail-
able on-line at www.fda.gov) (\Reinventing America II").
366Id.
367Id. See Pilot & Waldmann, supra, note 91.
368Id. Implemented in Final Rule: Elimination of the Establishment License Application
for Specied Biotechnology and Specied Synthetic Biological Products, 61 Fed.Reg. 24,227
(1996); Interim Denition and Elimination of Lot-by-Lot Release for Well-Characterized
Therapeutic Recombinant DNA-Derived and Monoclonal Antibody Biotechnology Products,
60 Fed.Reg. 63,048 (1995). See Food and Drug Administration, Department of Health and
Human Services, Vice President Al Gore Recognizes FDA's Program to Improve Inspections,
HHS News P98-14, April 21, 1998 (available on-line at www.fda.gov)
100tion of the ELA requirement would also allow manufacturers of biotechnology
products to contract out many of their manufacturing processes to third-parties,
placing them on more equal footing with their competitors manufacturing syn-
thetic non-biotechnological products.369 These changes essentially allowed all
\well-characterized" biotechnology products regulated as drugs to escape the
majority of the requirements of concurrent regulation as biologics.
The Reinventing America II report also contained FDA proposals for generalized
reforms applicable to all drugs and biologics. Prior to the Reinventing America
II report, FDA had required manufacturers of biological products to designate
a single person as a \Responsible Head" to exercise control of the manufactur-
ing facility and ensure compliance with all applicable CGMP regulations. This
requirement had proven burdensome for companies with large production fa-
cilities in multiple locations, and, to remedy this diculty, FDA stated in the
Reinventing America II report that FDA would allow companies to designate
more than one person to act as the \Responsible Head" of manufacturing for
a company.370FDA also proposed to further expedite the review of biologics by
eliminating the requirement that promotional labeling for biologics be approved
prior to use and by deciding within thirty days whether newly submitted infor-
mation supported the continuation of a clinical trial that had been put on hold
by FDA.371
369See Michele L. Robinson, FDA Circulates Draft to Equalize Regulation of Biotech Drugs,
Bioworld, vol. 6, No. 209, October 31, 1995 (available on-line as 1995 WL 14406660).
370Id. Implemented in Food and Drug Administration, Revision of the Requirements for a
Responsible Head for Biological Establishments, 62 Fed.Reg. 53,536 (1997).
371Reinventing America II report, supra, note 12.
101By late 1995, FDA had approved over thirty biotech products and almost
two-hundred biotechnology products had reached advanced clinical trials.372FDA
administrative reforms and use of funds provided from user fees had signi-
cantly reduced approval times and expanded early access to products prior to
approval. However, the two NPR reports still resulted in a signicant number
of hearings before multiple House and Senate subcommittees regarding the sta-
tus of FDA regulation, and these hearings ultimately inspired several proposals
in Congress aimed at legislative reform of FDA.373The rst of these legislative
reform bills was the proposed FDA Modernization Act of 1995 (\H.R. 1742"),
introduced in June of 1995.374Among the many provisions of the bill, H.R. 1742
proposed to allow \conditional approval" of new drugs and Class III medical
devices intended to treat \life-threatening or serious health conditions" during
the period in which a NDA or PMA application is pending, and the bill would
372Biomedical Market Newsletter, Biotech Products: Record Number Ready for FDA, Vol.
5, No. 7 ISSN: 1064-4180 (available on-line as 1995 WL 8379209); Lauran Neergaard, FDA
Eases Rules for Biotech Drugs, Associated Press, November 9, 1995 (available on-line as 1995
WL 4413545).
373These hearings included: FDA Approval Process, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Health and the Environ. of the House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (May
1, 1996); Need for Changes at the FDA, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 27, 1996); More
Information for Better Patient Care, Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human
Resources, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 22, 1996); Revitalizing New Product Development:
From Clinical Trials Through FDA Review, Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Labor
and Human Resources, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 21, 1996); Eect of Regulations on
Medical Technology Development, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Technology of the House
Comm. on Science, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 2, 1995); Elderly Access to Advance Medical
Technologies, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aging of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 13, 1995); FDA Approval of Drugs, Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Commerce,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 25, 1995); Reform of the Food and Drug Administration, Hearing
Before the Senate Labor and Human Resources Comm., 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Apr. 5, 1995).
From Pilot & Waldmann, supra, at fn. 32.
374H.R. 1742, 104th cong., 1st Sess. (June 6, 1995).
102have required review of IND applications within 30 days.375H.R. 1742 also con-
tained provisions that granted authority to, but did not require, FDA to cer-
tify private institutions to review aspects of 510(k) medical device \substantial
equivalence" applications.376This bill further proposed to reform labeling and
advertisement regulation by amending the denition of product \labeling" and
\advertisement" to exclude the distribution of \scientically valid" medical re-
ports and research contained in journals and textbooks to doctors and medical
insurance providers.377Additionally, H.R. 1742 proposed requiring FDA to issue
new CGMP regulations stating that manufacturing changes to facilities produc-
ing only drug and biological products \which can be characterized adequately
by physical or chemical methods" would not have to be pre-approved by FDA
unless \such manufacturing changes are specied in regulations as substantially
aecting the safety or ecacy of such drugs and biological products."378H.R.
1742 further proposed to reclassify a large group of Class II medical devices as
Class I devices.379
The second proposed legislative reform bill was the FDA Performance and
Accountability Act of 1995 (\S. 1477"), sponsored by Senator Nancy Kasse-
375H.R. 1742 || 4 (conditional approval), 5 (IND review).
376H.R. 1742 | 6.
377H.R. 1742 | 7(a).
378H.R. 1742 | 9.
379H.R. 1742 | 12.
103baum.380 S. 1477 proposed sweeping reforms and limitations to FDA regula-
tion, in an attempt to signicantly reduce the jurisdiction of FDA. First, S.
1477 proposed to redene the \mission" of FDA to reemphasize the goal of
rapid product approvals.381 The bill would have required FDA to review all
\standard" drugs within 180 days and all \priority" drugs within 120 days,
without providing FDA with any additional resources in order to meet these
deadlines.382 S. 1477 also proposed allowing private institutions to review Class
I and II medical device applications and some Class III devices.383 Additionally,
the bill proposed to signicantly expand the 510(k) exemption to allow medical
devices approved under existing 510(k) applications to be marketed for other
indications, without regard to risk, with only the submission of an abbreviated
510(k) notice application.384 S. 1477 also proposed that an unapproved use of a
product could be advertised in the labeling of the product if experienced physi-
cians had commonly prescribed the product for that unapproved use (called an
\o-label use") for a period of ve years.385
The third major piece of proposed reform legislation was the Drugs and Bio-
logical Products Reform Act proposal of 1996 (\H.R. 3199"), sponsored by a
bipartisan group of twelve members of Congress.386 H.R. 3199 rst proposed to
380S. 1477, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (December 13, 1995) (amended and reintroduced June 20,
1996). See also Pilot & Waldmann, supra, note 91, at 271.
381S. 1477 |2 (redening the \mission" of FDA to be"(1) facilitating the rapid and ecient
development and availability of products subject to its regulation; (2) protecting the public
from unsafe or ineective products subject to its regulation; and (3) enforcing the applicable
statutes and regulations in a timely, fair, consistent, and decisive manner.").
382S. 1477 |204. See Kessler Testimony, supra, note 344.
383S. 1477 |743. See also Pilot & Waldmann, supra, note 91, at 272.
384S. 1477 |702. See also Kessler Testimony, supra, note 344.
385S. 1477 |407. See also Kessler Testimony, supra, note 344.
386H.R. 3199, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (March 29, 1996).
104redene the \mission" of FDA as \[to] protect the public health and safety and
promptly and eciently review and approve clinical research and marketing of
products in a manner that does not unduly impede innovation or product avail-
ability."387 H.R. 3199 also proposed to signicantly reduce the volume of data
from clinical trials required to be submitted by manufacturers to FDA.388Similar
to the Kassebaum bill, H.R. 3199 contained a proposal to allow dissemination
of scientic and medical research publications regarding o-label uses of drugs
unless the manufacturer \in addition to disseminating the above-referenced
[o-label] information, encourage[d] the unapproved use of a legally marketed
drug or device through labeling, advertising, or other means of promotion."
389Inaddition;H:R:3199proposedtorequireFDAtoapproveoff labelusesofpreviously approveddrugsif\thenewuseiscommonamongcliniciansexperiencedinthefieldandrepresentsreasonableclinicalpracticebaseduponreliableclinicalexperienceandconfirmatoryinformation:
00390H.R.
3199 contained a proposal for mandatory accreditation of private institutions
to conduct the review of medical device applications, and H.R. 3199 further
proposed to allow such private institutions to conduct CGMP inspections as
well.391 The bill also contained proposals to allow pilot plants to receive ELA
and PLA licenses and to relax the pre-approval requirements for manufactur-
ing changes to facilities producing \well-characterized" drugs and biologicals.392
Interestingly, the bill contained a proposal requiring FDA to establish an infor-
mation system to track the status and progress of each pending application or
387H.R. 3199 |2(b).
388H.R. 3199 |4(a). See also Henry J. Miller, Failed FDA Reform, REGULATION, v. 21,
n. 3, p. 24-30, 1998, at 28.
389H.R. 3199 |20.
390H.R. 3199 |5(3).
391H.R. 3199 | 8.
392H.R. 3199 || 12 (pilot plants), 13 (well-characterized drugs and biologicals).
105submission.393
None of these legislative reform proposals was ultimately adopted. However,
the provisions contained within these initial reform proposals, in combination
with the changes proposed by FDA in the Reinventing America I and II reports,
formed the basis of reform legislation adopted the following year. The autho-
rization for FDA to collect user fees was set to expire in October of 1997, and
the necessity for reauthorization proved sucient to force a legislative compro-
mise.
This compromise was embodied in the FDA Modernization Act of 1997 (the
\1997 Act").394 The 1997 Act incorporated and expanded upon many of the
existing regulatory and legislative reform proposasls.395 First, the 1997 reau-
thorized the authority of FDA to collect user fees for an additional ve years,
with slight modications to the user fees structure and administration.396As
in 1992, in exchange for the authorization of user fees, the 1997 Act required
a new set of even more aggressive performance milestones. These milestones,
proposed separately from the 1997 Act, included decreasing the review times
for \standard" applications to ten months, two months faster than the goal
set in 1992, and maintaining the review time for \priority" applications at six
months, as required in 1992.397Following the examples of S. 1477 and H.R. 3199,
393H.R. 3199 |16.
394Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2,296 (Nov. 21, 1997).
395See generally, Michael A. Friedman, M.D., Acting Commissioner, Food and Drug Admin-
istration, Statement Before the Committee on Commerce, United States House of Represen-
tatives, October 7, 1998 (available on-line at www.fda.gov).
396Id. at || 101-107, 111 Stat. 2,297, codied at 21 U.S.C.A. | 379.
397Id. at | 101(4), 111 Stat. 2,298.
106the 1997 Act redened the \mission" of FDA as \[to] promote the public health
by promptly and eciently reviewing clinical research and taking appropriate
action on the marketing of regulated products in a timely manner", and the 1997
Act additionally required FDA to issue a detailed annual report of its progress
in reaching compliance with the provisions of the 1997 Act.398 Expanding upon
FDA's prior administrative reform announced in the Reinventing Government
II report of allowing a single application in place of the ELA and PLA appli-
cations for \well-characterized" biologicals, the 1997 Act unied the ELA and
PLA license requirement into a single Biologics License Application (BLA) for
all biologics, without regard to their status as \well-characterized".399 The 1997
Act contained provisions allowing data collected from a pilot plant to be used to
demonstrate the safety and eectiveness of a new drug, extending into the drug
context FDA's Reinventing Government II proposal to allow approvals for bio-
logics based upon data derived from pilot plants.400 The 1997 Act also required
FDA to implement \an information system to track the status and progress of
each application or submission", as had been suggested in H.R. 3199.401
The 1997 Act codied FDA's proposal from the Reinventing America I report
that a single adequate and well-controlled clinical trial could, in some cases,
be sucient to support an NDA application, a reform which FDA had already
begun to implement administratively.402 However, the 1997 Act tempered this
3981997 Act || 407(a)-(b) (mission), (g) (annual report), 111 Stat. 2369, codied at 21
U.S.C.A. |393.
3991997 Act | 123, 111 Stat. 2,322, codied at 21 U.S.C.A. | 262.
4001997 Act | 124, 111 Stat. 2,324, codied at 21 U.S.C.A. | 355.
401| 407, 111 Stat. 2,370.
402| 115(a), 111 Stat. 2,312, codied at 21 U.S.C.A. | 355 (\If the Secretary determines,
based on relevant science, that data from one adequate and well-controlled clinical investiga-
107reform by preserving the presumption that the majority of applications for new
products would still require at least two clinical trials in order to obtain ade-
quate data to demonstrate safety and eectiveness.403
The 1997 Act expanded the trial program of private institutional review of med-
ical device applications to which FDA had originally agreed in the Reinventing
America I report. 404Underthe1997Act;FDAwasrequiredtobeginaccreditingprivateinstitutionswithinoneyearofadoptionoftheAct:405
Private institutional reviewers were authorized both to review 510(k) \substan-
tial equivalence" applications for specied Class I and Class II medical devices
and to make recommendations to FDA regarding the appropriate initial clas-
sication of devices.406The 1997 Act set an outer limit to the private review
system, however, prohibiting private institutions from reviewing any Class III
medical device or any Class II medical device that either was \intended to be
permanently implantable or life sustaining or life supporting" or \require[d] clin-
ical data in the report submitted under section 510(k)".407 The 1997 Act also
granted FDA's request in the Reinventing America I report for authorization to
collect user fees to support the system of private institutional review of medical
devices.408
tion and conrmatory evidence (obtained prior to or after such investigation) are sucient
to establish eectiveness, the Secretary may consider such data and evidence to constitute
substantial evidence for purposes of [product approval].").
403Food and Drug Administration, Department of Health and Human Services, Food and
Drug Administration Modernization Act Backgrounder, 97-13 (1997) (available on-line at
www.fda.gov).
4041997 Act | 210, 111 Stat. 2,341, codied at 21 U.S.C.A. | 360(m).
405Id. at | 210(a)(1).
406Id.
4071997 Act | 210(a)(3), 111 Stat. 2,342, codied at 21 U.S.C.A. | 360(m).
408Id. at |210(b)(5) (\Compensation for an accredited person shall be determined by agree-
ment between the accredited person and the person who engages the services of the accredited
person, and shall be paid by the person who engages such services.").
108The 1997 Act contained provisions containing reforms to FDA regulation
of o-label uses.409 The o-label reform provisions contained in the 1997 Act
struck a balance between the highly-restricted role of FDA in regulating o-
label uses under the H.R. 3199 and S. 1477 proposals and FDA's traditional
requirement that all such o-label uses be pre-approved under a supplemen-
tal NDA application. Under these provisions, a manufacturer could distribute
written information concerning the safety, eectiveness, and benets of a use
not described in the approved labeling of a drug or device if the drug or device
was already approved by FDA for a separate use, the manufacturer had submit-
ted a supplemental NDA application to cover the intended use or had certied
that it intended to submit such an application, the materials to be distributed
contained a statutorily-prescribed warning and disclosure statement, and the
manufacturer submitted to FDA at least sixty days prior to any such proposed
distribution both the written materials to be distributed and \any clinical trial
information the manufacturer ha[d] relating to the safety or eectiveness of the
new use, any reports of clinical experience pertinent to the safety of the new
use, and a summary of such information".410 The written materials to be so dis-
tributed could consist only of unabridged peer reviewed articles \considered to
be scientically sound" or unabridged \reference publications" and could only
409| 401(a), 111 Stat. 2,357, codied at 21 U.S.C.A. | 360aaa. See generally, Food and Drug
Administration, Department of Health and Human Services, FDA Proposes Rules for Dis-
semination of Information on O-Label Uses, HHS News (available on-line at www.fda.gov).
FDA implemented these provisions in Food and Drug Administration, Disseination of Infor-
mation on Unapproved/New Uses for Marketed Drugs, Biologics, and Devices, 63 Fed.Reg.
64,555 (Nov. 20, 1998).
410| 401(a), 111 Stat. 2,357, codied at 21 U.S.C.A. | 360aaa.
109be distributed so long such materials were \not false or misleading and would
not pose a signicant risk to the public health."411Additionally, such written
materials could only be distributed to health care practitioners, pharmacy ben-
et managers, health insurance issuers, group health plans, and Federal or State
governmental agencies.412
The 1997 Act contained an extensive set of reforms to designed to expedite
the FDA review process and allow seriously-ill patients early access to novel
therapies prior to completion of the entire FDA review process. First, the 1997
Act required that FDA \facilitate the development and expedite the review of
[a new] drug if it is intended for the treatment of a serious or life-threatening
condition and it demonstrates the potential to address unmet medical needs for
such a condition", which essentially codied the accelerated approval process;
the 1997 Act refers to such accelerated new drugs as \fast track products".413
The 1997 Act required FDA to review applications for fast track treatment
of new products within sixty days.414 The fast track provisions also codied
FDA's existing practice of approving NDA applications based upon evidence
that a product had an eect on a surrogate endpoint.415Second, the 1997 Act
411Id. at 2,358. A \reference publication" was dened as \a publication that (1) has not been
written, edited, excerpted, or published specically for, or at the request of, a manufacturer of
a drug or device; (2) has not been edited or signicantly inuenced by such a manufacturer; (3)
is not solely distributed through such a manufacturer but is generally available in bookstores
or other distribution channels where medical textbooks are sold; (4) does not focus on any
particular drug or device of a manufacturer that disseminates information under [the o-
label reform provisions]...and does not have a primary focus on new uses of drugs or devices
that are marketed or under investigation by a manufacturer supporting the dissemination of
information; and (5) presents materials that are not false or misleading." (Id. at 2,359).
412Id. at 2,357.
413| 112(a), 111 Stat. 2,309, codied at 21 U.S.C.A. | 356. See Friedman, supra, note 391.
414Id.
415| 112(b), 111 Stat. 2,309, codied at 21 U.S.C.A. | 356. See Friedman, supra, note 391.
110codied reforms to the IND process. Manufacturers had complained that the
disclosure and paperwork requirements necessary to institute a clinical trial were
excessively burdensome and that, once a trial was nally initiated, the clinical
hold procedures available to FDA to stop such a trial granted excessive adminis-
trative discretion to FDA. To streamline the IND application process, the 1997
Act reduced the information required to be disclosed to FDA prior to initiation
of the IND process and stated that a manufacturer could begin the IND process
thirty days after ling this required information with FDA.416 To address the
complaints regarding the discretion of FDA to place a clinical trial on hold, the
1997 Act allowed FDA to institute a clinical hold only if it rst determined that
\the drug involved represents an unreasonable risk to the safety of the persons
who are the subjects of the clinical investigation" and then required FDA to
place the reasons for this determination in writing.417
Third, the 1997 Act codied the exiting treatment IND procedures, originally
proposed administratively by FDA in the IND Rewrite. These provisions au-
thorized FDA to allow manufacturers to conduct treatment INDs for \investi-
gational drugs or investigational devices for the diagnosis, monitoring, or treat-
ment of a serious disease or condition in emergency situations."418 For treat-
ment INDs involving multiple patients, termed \expanded access protocols"
under the 1997 Act, these provisions required FDA to approve a treatment IND
application if the product was intended to treat a \serious or immediately life-
416| 117, 111 Stat. 2,315, codied at 21 U.S.C.A. | 355.
417Id.
418| 402, 111 Stat. 2,365, codied at 21 U.S.C.A. | 360bbb.
111threatening disease or condition" and was already the subject of clinical trials
in the general IND process, the manufacturer was pursuing approval in these
general trials with \due diligence", \no comparable or satisfactory alternative
therapy" existed, and there was either, in the case of serious diseases, \sucient
evidence of safety and eectiveness to support the use described [in the IND ap-
plication]" or, in the case of immediately life-threatening diseases, \the available
scientic evidence, taken as a whole, provide[d] a reasonable basis to conclude
that the [product] may be eective for its intended use and would not expose
patients to an unreasonable and signicant risk of illness or injury."419The 1997
Act provisions also allowed individual patients to be the subject of a treatment
IND.420As early as 1968, FDA had informally allowed individual patients that
could not participate in larger clinical trials to access investigational products in
a separate single patient protocol, often called a \compassionate use" study.421
The 1997 Act codied this informal practice, allowing single patient INDs if a
\licensed physician determine[d] that the person ha[d] no comparable or satis-
factory alternative therapy available to diagnose, monitor, or treat the disease
or condition involved", \the probable risk to the person from the [product] [wa]s
not greater than the probable risk from the disease or condition", \sucient evi-
dence of safety and eectiveness to support the [investigational] use" existed, the
single patient IND would \not interfere with the initiation, conduct, or comple-
tion of clinical investigations to support marketing approval", and the product
419| 402(c), 111 Stat. 2,367, codied at 21 U.S.C.A. |360bbb.
420| 402(b), 111 Stat. 2,365-6, codied at 21 U.S.C.A. |360bbb.
421Friedman, supra, note 391.
112manufacturer consented and led a clinical protocol for the single patient IND
study.422 These provisions also authorized FDA's existing practice of allowing
\emergency INDs", which are single patient INDs intended to treat emergency
illnesses in which the treating physician did not have sucient time, prior to
the initiation of treatment, to le the required treatment IND paperwork with
FDA; in practice, FDA had authorized the majority of these emergency uses
of investigational products over the phone within a few hours of the treating
physician's request.423
VI. Conclusion
The administrative and legislative reforms during the 1980s and 1990s re-
sulted in a streamlined and highly-ecient regulatory framework for products of
biotechnology. FDA review times for biotechnology products were comparable
to or only slightly longer than those of its counterparts in Europe for general
applications, and FDA review times were signicantly faster for priority appli-
cations.424 A survey of biotechnology industry executives, released at the BIO
2000 Conference in Boston, found a high level of industry satisfaction with the
changes to FDA regulatory review of the products of biotechnology.425 FDA
has also continued to maintain both its position as the key regulator of the
422| 402(b), 111 Stat. 2,365-6, codied at 21 U.S.C.A. |360bbb.
423Id. Friedman, supra, note 40.
424Marketletter, EMEA Approvals of New Biotech Drugs Faster than US FDA, Says
Tufts Study, April 3, 2000 (available on-line as 2000 WL 7541236). (\The total review times
during 1995-99 were for companies based in: Denmark - 386 days; Germany - 414 days; USA
- 450 days; Netherlands - 488 days; and Switzerland - 507 days...[and] FDA approval times
are considerably faster than the EMEA's for priority products).
425Thomas Kupper, Biotechs say FDA Services Improve, San Diego Union-Tribune, March
29, 2000 (available on-line as 2000 WL 13956301).
113biotechnology products and its central role in the regulation of biotechnology
research generally.
An example of the signicant role of FDA regulation of biotechnology at the end
of the century came when, in February of 1997, scientists at the Roslin Institute
in Scotland announced that they had successfully cloned an entire sheep, pro-
ducing an exact genetic replica of its mother.426This announcement sparked in-
tense public debate concerning the potential implications of cloning humans.427
These concerns led President Clinton to stop all federal funding for research
involving the cloning of humans.428 President Clinton directed the National
Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) to analyze the legal and ethical im-
plications of human cloning, and, three months later, the NBAC recommended
that Congress adopt legislation banning all such research.429 Legislation was
proposed at both the state and federal levels to ban research involving human
cloning.430Though some of the state legislative proposals were adopted, federal
426See Ian Wilmut, Dolly's False Legacy, Time, January 11, 1999.
427Id.
428President Clinton, Memorandum on the Prohibition on Federal Funding for Cloning of
Human Beings, 33 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 281 (Mar. 4, 1997); President Clinton,
Speech Regarding the Prohibition on Federal Funding for Cloning of Human Beings, 33 Weekly
Comp. Pres. Doc. 281 (Mar. 4, 1997). See Elizabeth C. Price, Does the FDA Have Authority
to Regulate Human Cloning?, 11 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 619, 623 (Summer 1998).
429National Bioethics Advisory Commission, Cloning Human Beings: Report and Recom-
mendations of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission, at 15-16 (1997). See also Gre-
gory J. Rokosz, Human Cloning: Is the Reach of FDA Authority Too Far A Stretch?, 30
Seton Hall L. Rev. 464, 465 (2000).
430See Rokosz, supra, note 70, fn. 9, 14 (citing S. 511, 1997 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 1997);
A.B. 1082, 1997 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 1997); S.J.R. 14, 1997-98 Leg., 1st Sess. (Cal. 1997);
S.C.R. 39, 1997-98 Leg., 1st Sess. (Cal. 1997); S. 1344, 1997-98 Leg., 1st Sess. (Cal. 1997)
(enacted); A.B. 1251, 1997-98 Leg., 1st Sess. (Cal. 1997); H.B. 1237, 1997-98 Leg., 1st Sess.
(Fla. 1997); H.B. 2235, 90th Leg., 1st Sess. (Ill. 1997); H.B. 1829, 90th Leg., 1st Sess. (Ill.
1997); S. 134, 118th Leg., 1st Sess. (Me. 1997); H.J.R. 28, 1997-98 Leg., 1st Sess. (Md.
1997); H.B. 4846, 89th Leg., 1st Sess. (Mich. 1997); H.B. 4962, 89th Leg., 1st Sess. (Mich.
1997); H.B. 824, 89th Leg., 1st Sess. (Mo. 1997); A.B. 2849, 207th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J.
1997); S. 2877, 220th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1997); A.B. 5383, 220th Leg., Reg., Sess. (N.Y.
1997); S. 782, 1997-98 Leg., 1st Sess. (N.C. 1997); S. 1017, 69th Leg., 1st Sess. (Or. 1997);
H.B. 3617, 112th Leg., 1st Sess. (S.C. 1997); S. 410, 73rd Leg., 1st Sess. (W. Va. 1997); S.
114legislation banning human cloning experiments was not passed.431 This Con-
gressional inaction meant that, although no public funds could be utilized to
conduct human cloning research, there existed no prohibition upon private re-
search involving the cloning of humans.
Amidst this debate, in early 1998, a Chicago physicist announced that he would
attempt to clone humans using private funding sources.432 In response, Secre-
tary of Health and Human Services Donna Shalala announced her opposition
to this private research project, and, shortly thereafter, the President of the
Biotechnology Industry Organization sent a letter to Secretary Shalala, copied
to FDA Commissioner Friedman, requesting that FDA regulate all research
involving human cloning.433
One week later, FDA announced its intention to regulate research involving
human cloning and to prosecute any person conducting such research with-
out receiving prior approval from FDA.434Some commentators have questioned
whether FDA's administrative jurisdiction will actually extend to the regula-
1574, 105th Cong. (1998); S. 1599, 105th Cong. (1998); S. 1601, 105th Cong. (1998); S. 1602,
105th Cong. (1998); S. 1611, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R. 3133, 105th Cong. (1998)).
431See B. Jason Erb , Deconstructing the Human Egg: The FDA's Regulation of Scientically
Created Babies, 5 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 273, 274-5 (Fall 1999).
432See Wendy Cole, Seed of Controversy, Time, January 11, 1999.
433Secretary Shalala's announcement was made on the CBS television show \Face the Na-
tion", on January 11, 1998; Letter from Carl B. Feldman, President, Biotechnology Industry
Organization to The Honorable Donna E. Shalala, Secretary, Department of Health & Hu-
man Services, (Jan. 13, 1998) (on le with the Harvard Journal of Law & Technology). Price,
supra, note 424 at 623-4.
434See Rick Weiss, Human Clone Research Will Be Regulated; FDA Asserts It Has Statutory
Authority To Regulate Attempts at Human Cloning, Washington Post, Section A1, Jan. 20,
1998 (available on-line as 1998 WL 2462936) (\'Through the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
we do have the authority to regulate human cloning, and we are prepared to assert that
authority,' acting FDA Commissioner Michael A. Friedman said in an interview.). F.D.C.
Reports, 60 The Pink Sheet No. 3, Jan. 19, 1998 at T&G1.
115tion of human cloning if challenged in court, however, FDA already regulated
genetic modication of cellular and tissue-based products, transfers of recom-
binant DNA into human subjects, and human somatic-cell gene therapies, and
human cloning experiments incorporated aspects of each of these areas of re-
search.435
FDA's expertise in the regulation of biotechnology, its high level of interaction
with industry participants, and its ability to respond rapidly to scientic ad-
vances and discoveries have placed FDA in an ideal position to regulate the
products of biotechnology. FDA's reforms and administrative initiatives insti-
tuted during the twentieth century have created a framework of regulation that
will ensure that the public remains safeguarded from potential medical hazards
while review and approval of novel products of biotechnology produced in the
years to come are not unduly delayed.
435Food and Drug Administration, Proposed Approach to Regulation of Cellular and Tissue-
Based Products, 62 Fed. Reg. 9,721 (March 4, 1997); Food and Drug Administration, Re-
combinant DNA Research: Request for Public Comment on Points to Consider in the Design
and Submission of Protocols for the Transfer of Recombinant DNA into Human Subjects,
54 Fed. Reg. 266,660 (June 23, 1989); Food and Drug Administration, Recombinant DNA
Research; Request for Public Comment on Points to Consider in the Design and Submission
of Human Somatic-Cell Gene Therapy Protocols, 54 Fed. Reg. 10,956 (March 15, 1989). For
commentator analyses of FDA administrative jurisdiction over human cloning, see e.g. Weiss,
supra, note 430; Price, supra, note 424; Erb, supra, note 427; Rokosz, supra, note 425.
116